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Abstract 
 
Limited research has examined individual differences in the accumulation of misinformation and 
unwarranted beliefs, known as contaminated mindware. The three unwarranted beliefs examined 
in this dissertation are paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs. These beliefs remain 
prevalent in the public despite their epistemically suspect or unsubstantiated nature. This 
dissertation focused on the psychometric properties of items measuring individual differences in 
unwarranted beliefs to address three research objectives: (1) examine the underlying dimensional 
structure of unwarranted belief items in adolescents and young adults, (2) examine individual 
differences predicting susceptibility to these beliefs, and (3) examine differences between 
adolescents and young adults with respect to these beliefs. Study One examined the underlying 
structure of individual differences in unwarranted belief scores and its correlates in a sample of 
young-adults. Study Two confirmed that the same structure and correlates are found in 
adolescents. Both studies demonstrate the multidimensional nature of unwarranted beliefs that 
form domains of contaminated mindware. Specifically, the optimal factor model among 
adolescents and young adults was a hierarchical factor model with three correlated general 
factors (paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs) and four specific paranormal factors 
(i.e., psi, superstition, spiritualism, and precognition). Further, we observed unique effects of 
individual differences in thinking and reasoning on individual differences in unwarranted beliefs. 
In Study Three, we assessed the measurement invariance of these scales across the two 
developmental groups, to allow for cross-sectional comparisons and age associations. The 
paranormal and conspiracy scales were characterized by strict invariance and the anti-science 
scale was characterized by strong invariance. With respect to developmental comparisons, 
endorsement of the unwarranted beliefs did not differ across development, except for a small 
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difference in paranormal belief. Further, the unwarranted beliefs total scores were not associated 
with age. We discuss the novelty of the results within the belief literature on contaminated 
mindware and focus on the utility of this scale for future research.   
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
There has never been a time in history when we have been bombarded with more 
information, especially information that may be unsubstantiated. These unsubstantiated or 
unwarranted beliefs can be harmful for individuals and society, and accumulating these beliefs 
results in the problem of contaminated mindware (Stanovich, 2009; Stanovich, Toplak, & West, 
2008; Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2016). Mindware refers to one’s accumulated and stored 
knowledge, beliefs, strategies, and rules that are relied upon for making decisions (Perkins, 
1995). Contaminated mindware specifically refers to the accumulation of misinformation and 
unwarranted beliefs, some of which may stop individuals from engaging in reflection and 
considering alternatives (Stanovich, 2009). Irrespective of how intelligent we may be as a 
society, individuals continue to believe in pseudoscience, such as paranormal, conspiracy, and 
anti-science beliefs (Lobato, Mendoza, Sims, & Chin, 2014; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 
2015b). Although these unwarranted beliefs are prevalent (Angus Reid Poll, 2015; 2016; Gallup 
& Newport, 1990), research examining the associations among these three domains of 
contaminated mindware remains scarce. Even less work has been done on contaminated 
mindware in adolescence as most measurement tools have been developed for adult samples, 
raising the question of whether current measures are appropriate for adolescents. Here we 
examined the underlying dimensional structure of unwarranted belief items in two periods of 
development: adolescence and young adulthood. In doing so, we estimated the relations among 
three unwarranted beliefs which help to constitute contaminated mindware. Our research also 
examined likely predictors of unwarranted beliefs, including cognitive ability, academic 
achievement, actively open-minded thinking, cognitive reflection, and ontological confusions. 
Adolescents and young adults heavily rely on media outlets and the Internet (Pew Research 
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Center, 2010; 2015). This information technology makes the widespread dissemination of 
unwarranted beliefs easier than ever before (Eve & Dunn, 1990), making it increasingly 
important to study such beliefs.  
Contaminated mindware can impact thinking and reasoning when trying to make a 
rational decision. Similarly, the ability to think rationally can also impact the amount of 
contaminated mindware accumulated. This research may inform educational curricula, helping 
adolescents and young adults recognize beliefs that may be harmful or unhelpful. We begin with 
a review of the literature on rational thinking and contaminated mindware generally, then 
describe our studies in detail.  
Rational thinking and belief acquisition 
Rational thinking is a broad and multifaceted construct that encompasses multiple aspects 
of thinking (Stanovich & West, 2000), including holding relevant goals and beliefs in mind and 
acting on them (Stanovich et al., 2008). Work on rational thinking has often been informed by 
research on how this thinking can be undermined, through heuristics and biases in judgment and 
decision-making (Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2003; 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Heuristics 
are a set of mental shortcuts that are characterized by intuition and speed. Although they can be 
adaptive in familiar settings, they can lead to errors in judgment in novel situations (Kahneman, 
2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). People also tend to make systematic judgemental errors, 
referred to as biases (Stanovich, 2018; Stanovich et al., 2016). Rational thinking is typically 
indexed using tasks that measure such heuristics and biases (West, Toplak, & Stanovich 2008). 
These types of thinking can also be conceptualized within the framework of dual-process models 
of information processing (Stanovich et al., 2016).  
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Dual-process models generally consist of two types of processes that function at different 
levels of speed, intuition, awareness, and deliberation. Different authors attribute different names 
to the two separate modes of processing (see Evans 2008; Stanovich, 2011, for a discussion of 
the different versions). In line with Evans (2008), we use the terms System 1 and System 2 in this 
dissertation (Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich, 1999). System 1 processes are intuitive, implicit, and 
autonomous processes, whereas System 2 processes are deliberative, reflective, and analytical 
(Stanovich, 1999). More specifically, System 1 encompasses several types of processing that 
share an automaticity feature but can have distinct etiologies, including innate procedures, 
overlearned associations, and emotion regulation processes (Stanovich et al., 2016). System 1 
processes are typically the default processes employed when one is reasoning or making daily 
decisions, unless System 2 processes are deliberately employed. System 2 processes are 
complex, multi-level, and serial in nature (Kahneman, 2011), and System 2 is important for 
overriding incorrect responses generated by System 1 (Kahneman, 2003; Frederick, 2005). For 
System 2 to succeed, it needs to identify and inhibit intuitive responses and generate potential 
alternatives (Stanovich et al., 2016). To generate these alternatives via mental simulations, 
System 2 must be able to separate these alternatives from reality, known as cognitive decoupling 
(Stanovich, 2009; 2011). In addition, Stanovich (2009; 2012) divides System 2 processes into 
algorithmic and reflective processes. Algorithmic-level processes include one’s cognitive 
abilities. These processes reflect one’s potential and intellectual resources, but are not always 
relied on when making daily decisions. Reflective processes, the aspect of System 2, are 
dispositions that represent one’s values, beliefs, and attitudes about how these values and beliefs 
are formed and revised (Stanovich et al., 2016). One of these reflective dispositions is known as 
Actively Open-minded Thinking (AOT), the tendency to actively seek and consider several 
	 4	
possible conclusions even if they contradict or challenge one’s initial or preferred conclusion and 
beliefs (Baron, Gürçay, & Metz, 2016; Sá, West, & Stanovich, 1999). Higher AOT invites 
deliberation and reflection when making decisions and reviewing evidence in both adults (e.g., 
Baron, Scott, Fincher, & Metz, 2015; Heijltjes, van Gog, Leppink, & Paas, 2015; Stanovich et 
al., 2016) and children (e.g., Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2002; Toplak, 
West, & Stanovich, 2014a).  
A person typically relies on System 1 when making daily decisions in familiar, well-
acquainted, and learnt situations, without the need to make modifications using System 2 
(Kahneman, 2011). In other words, people can comfortably rely on their initial impressions when 
acting on their desires in most routine and mundane situations. However, System 1 might be 
insufficient when making a decision regarding a novel problem or goal and might need to resort 
to one’s stored mindware before making a decision. System 2 processing relies on one’s 
mindware to successfully override System 1 processing. System 2 processes are also vital for 
updating and revising one’s mindware. 
We need to ensure that our decisions and actions are based on what we know to be true of 
the world and on beliefs that are accurate, known as epistemic rationality (Stanovich, 2016; 
Stanovich et al., 2016). Epistemic rationality and goal pursuit work in tandem (Kelly, 2003). 
People improve their epistemic position whenever they pursue a specific goal, solve a problem, 
or address a question, in turn acquiring knowledge or belief that more accurately reflects what is 
true of the world. Accumulated beliefs are generally stable and persistent, and reflect “enduring, 
unquestioned ontological representations of the world and comprise primary convictions about 
events, causes, agency, and objects that subjects use and accept as veridical” (Connors & 
Halligan, 2015). Simply put, a person believes in something when they regard it as true, without 
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needing to actively reflect on that belief (Schwitzgebel, 2015). Individuals make meaning of life 
and process new information and situations through their beliefs (Halligan, 2007). They also 
base their behaviour and actions on these beliefs (Tullett, Prentice, Teper, Nash, Inzlicht, & 
Mcgregor, 2013). Nonetheless, beliefs should be challenged and revised as new information is 
presented, and System 2 plays an integral role in updating and revising one’s mindware and 
epistemic position.  
It is expected that most people desire to hold beliefs that are true (Foley, 1987). People 
are also expected to continuously update their epistemic positions (Kelly 2003). However, 
humans are susceptible to holding some form of epistemically-suspect and unwarranted beliefs in 
their mindware due to their limited cognitive system (Foley,1992). Our information processing 
system is inherently disposed to reasoning errors and biases that lead to the accumulation of 
unwarranted beliefs (Gilovich, 1991; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). For example, people’s 
misunderstanding of randomness results in superstitious beliefs and behaviour (Vyse, 1997). An 
over-reliance on pattern recognition and causal inference can also contribute to the acquisition of 
unwarranted beliefs (Foster & Kokko, 2009). Despite the shortcomings of our cognitive system, 
our cognitive system generally works well and is not so harmful that we abandon it (Foley, 
1992). Nonetheless, the accumulation of unwarranted beliefs becomes concerning when it 
contributes to a problematic and self-sustaining worldview (Swami et al., 2011; Wood et al., 
2012). The problem of accumulating misinformation and unwarranted beliefs, resulting in 
contaminated mindware, is particularly relevant in the current age of information virality 
(Gleick, 2012).  
Contaminated mindware 
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There are many categories of contaminated mindware, but the focus here is on three 
related domains of unwarranted beliefs: paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs. These 
beliefs have been well-documented in adults, but to a lesser extent within adolescents.  
 Paranormal beliefs. Paranormal phenomena generally violate the principles of science or 
current scientific understanding (Broad, 1953; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). Paranormal 
phenomena are further distinguished as beliefs that are incompatible with core knowledge about 
mental phenomena, material objects, and living and animate organisms (Lindeman, 2018; 
Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012). Humans universally possess, learn, and rely on several systems 
of core knowledge about the world that do not necessitate explicit education (Spelke, 2004; 
Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). Systems of knowledge represent central aspects of physical, biological, 
and mental ontologies, as well as knowledge about inanimate objects and agents with goal-
directed behaviour. Paranormal phenomena seem to confuse or blur the distinctions among core 
knowledge systems (Lindeman, 2018). For example, these confusions can often be categorized 
into one of the following categories: (1) biological and physical phenomena interpreted as 
possessing psychological properties, such as beliefs, desires, and intentionality; (2) mental and 
physical phenomena seen as possessing the properties of biological beings, such as living and 
healing; and (3) mental phenomena viewed as possessing the properties of physical phenomena, 
such as force, energy, independent existence, and an ability to influence or touch objects 
(Lindeman & Aarino, 2006). For example, the erroneous belief that a flightless bird (e.g., an 
ostrich) can fly is not paranormal, but the belief that horoscopes can predict the future or 
determine one’s personality is, because it includes a category confusion or ontological mistake 
(Risen, 2016). This paranormal belief assumes that a symbol (i.e., horoscope) or a mental 
property exists independently and has the ability to influence external events.  
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Paranormal beliefs include a belief in Psi (e.g., psychokinesis), witchcraft (e.g., spells and 
black magic), superstition (e.g., lucky numbers), spiritualism (e.g., communication with the 
deceased), precognition (e.g., astrology predicting the future), extraordinary life forms (e.g., The 
abominable snowman of Tibet), and supernatural phenomena (Lindeman & Aarino, 2007; 
Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012). The New Age movement in the 1970s and 1980s helped to 
propagate paranormal beliefs in contemporary society, rejecting Western science and technology 
and reintroducing superstition (Vyse, 1997). Conspiracy theories also helped to cultivate 
paranormal beliefs, such as the belief in extraterrestrials and unidentified flying objects (UFOs) 
(Vyse, 1997). We conceptualize these multifarious and distinct beliefs within a broader 
paranormal belief domain (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012). Such a conceptualization has also 
been adopted and empirically supported by two popular measures of paranormal beliefs in young 
adulthood and adulthood: The Australian Sheep-Goat Scale and the Revised Paranormal Belief 
Scale (Drinkwater, Denovan, Dagnall, & Parker, 2017;2018; Thalbourne & Delin, 1993; 
Tobacyk, 2004). The measures in the child and adolescent research remain relatively separate in 
their measurement of these sub-domains of belief (e.g., Bolton, Dearsley, Madronal-Luque, & 
Baron-Cohen, 2002; Preece & Bexter, 2000; Kokis et al., 2002).  
Conspiracy Beliefs. Conspiracy theories attribute the cause of an event to secret plots by 
powerful groups or forces (Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Goertzel, 1994; McCauley & Jacques, 
1979). These theories are resistant to falsification and lack evidence of their validity (Sutton & 
Douglas, 2014), despite sometimes being true. A general conspiracist belief reflects “the 
unnecessary assumption of conspiracy when other explanations are more probable” 
(Aaronovitch, 2009, p. 5). Conspiracist belief rejects and deflects criticism, labeling any 
criticism as part of the conspiracy, further confirming the conspiracist belief system (Bourdy & 
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Braeckman, 2012). Part of what makes conspiracist beliefs so robust is that they support all kinds 
of other similar beliefs, including contradictory conspiracy theories (Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 
2012) and fictitious conspiracies concocted by researchers (Swami et al., 2011). Examples of 
generic conspiracist belief include “the government routinely hides information in order to 
deceive the public,” and “the government secretly perpetrates terrorist activities on their own 
citizens”. These generic conspiracy beliefs appear to precede one’s tendency to endorse more 
specific event-based conspiracies (Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013; Wood et al., 2012).  
Individual differences in holding conspiracy beliefs have been conceptualized as a 
unidimensional construct, such that a general conspiracy factor or construct underlies one’s 
endorsement of separate conspiracy beliefs (Dagnall, Drinkwater, Parker, Denovan, & Parton, 
2015). In the young-adult and adult literature, two prominent generic conspiracy belief 
questionnaires exist: The Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire and the Generic Conspiracist 
Beliefs scale (e.g., Brotherton et al., 2013; Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouriparah, & Imhoff, 2013). 
Generic conspiracy belief measures remain largely underdeveloped within research on children 
and adolescents.    
Anti-science beliefs and attitudes. Anti-science beliefs refer to the rejection of and 
opposition to the scientific method (Holton 1992;1993). General anti-science attitudes and 
beliefs include seeing science as possessing low credibility (Hartman, Dieckmann, Sprenger, 
Stastny, & DeMarree, 2017), with a preference for intuition and instinct instead (Stanovich et al., 
2016). Examples include denying climate change, being skeptical of the effectiveness of 
vaccinations, questioning the validity of evolution (Hmielowski, Feldman, Myers, Leiserwoitz & 
Maibach, 2014; Lewandowsky et al., 2013; Lewandowsky, Oberaur, & Gignac, 2013; Lobato et 
al., 2014), and endorsing alternative medicine (e.g., van den Bulck & Custers, 2009). The 
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American public remains divided on many of these scientific issues (Pew Research center, 
2015). Much of the past research with young-adult and adult samples has studied individuals’ 
trust in science using psychometrically underdeveloped or unsupported items, such as single 
questions (e.g., Malka, Krosnick, & Langer, 2009). Only recently has the 6-item Credibility of 
Science Scale been developed for use with young-adults and adults (Hartman et al., 2017). 
Unfortunately, we could not identify any work on anti-science beliefs and attitudes using child 
and adolescent samples, although some studies have assessed attitudes towards science as a 
subject of study in grade school (e.g., Francis & Greer, 1999; 2001; Kind, Jones, & Barmby, 
2007). In line with the Credibility of Science Scale, we focused on generic anti-science beliefs 
and attitudes that are context independent and represent rejection of using scientific findings to 
adjudicate knowledge. We expect that a general anti-science belief and attitude factor precedes 
and explains one’s inclination towards a range of scientific issues and outcomes, such as climate 
change and vaccination.  
Shared characteristics among unwarranted beliefs 
Paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs often present themselves as science, but 
are in fact an imitation that offers inaccurate information (Boudry, Blancke, & Pigliucci, 2015). 
Further, these beliefs rely upon a “nonscientific evidentiary process” (Losh, Tavani, Njoroge, 
Wilke, & Mcauley, 2003) and some fail empirical tests, or cannot be empirically tested (Peerce 
and Baxter, 2000). The self-validating nature of these beliefs increases their appeal and 
prevalence in the public (Boudry & Braeckman, 2012). Stanovich (2004) discusses unwarranted 
beliefs within the framework of memetic theory, in which a meme is a cultural unit analogous to 
a gene (Dawkins,1976). A meme is a selfish replicator that exists for its own propagation across 
culture, regardless of its validity and in the absence of benefit to the person that holds it 
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(Stanovich, 2004). The persistence of these beliefs is partly a function of their structure, which 
enables various “epistemic defense mechanisms” (Boudry & Braeckman, 2011; 2012). Because 
these beliefs support multiple interpretations, they are difficult to contradict. For example, 
horoscopes make multiple predictions (Gilovich, 1991), including broad ones that allow anyone 
to find inevitable matches with real events. These beliefs also often retreat to a weaker version of 
an original hypothesis in the face of a failed prediction, known as “deflationary revision.” Some 
beliefs also permit retrospective interpretation of phenomena and are therefore inherently 
resistant to falsification (Boudry & Braeckman, 2011). For example, alternative medicine and 
spiritual healing attribute any failure to one of three causes: (1) inappropriate administration of 
the intervention, (2) a specific type of intervention being unsuitable, or (3) interference of 
invisible factors or spirits. A fundamental defense mechanism of conspiracy belief is the 
tendency to deflect any troubling counterevidence or criticism. Believers of conspiracy theories 
“turn the evidence on its head,” claiming that any contradiction is precisely what would have 
been predicted by their theory (Boudry & Braeckman, 2011; 2012).  
These three domains of contaminated mindware have been primarily studied either 
singularly or in pairs, but they are all positively associated (e.g. Browne, Thomson, Rockloff, & 
Pennycook, 2015; Bruder et al., 2013; Darwin, Neave, & Holmes, 2011; Drinkwater, Dagnall, & 
Parker, 2012; Lewandowsky et al., 2013; van den Bulck & Custers, 2010), supporting the 
comorbid nature of unwarranted beliefs. It also supports the idea that when a person endorses 
some unwarranted beliefs, they are likely to endorse similar beliefs using prior beliefs as 
evidence, contributing to a self-sustaining worldview, known as a monological belief system 
(Lobato et al., 2014; Swami et al., 2011; Wood et al., 2012).  
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Although they may seem harmless, the comorbid nature of unwarranted beliefs can have 
negative effects on rational thinking (Stanovich, 2009; Evans & Stanovich, 2013), by 
discouraging critical thinking and reflection (Boudry, Blancke, & Pigliucci, 2015). This lack of 
thoughtful consideration and resistance to scientific advancements is concerning to society 
(Mackintosh, Lovas, & Schopper, 1999), with endorsement of unwarranted beliefs associated 
with increased rejection of science, reduced civic engagement, and reduced prosocial behaviour 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2013; Jolley & Douglas, 2014; van den Bulck & Custers, 2010; van der 
Linden, 2015). Economically, these effects translate into billions of dollars spent on untested and 
unsubstantiated treatments (Nahin, Barnes, Stussman, & Bloom, 2009) and a decline in concern 
regarding climate change (Brulle, Carmichael, & Jenkins, 2012; Scruggs & Benegal, 2012). 
Considering the negative consequences of these beliefs, it is important to understand the 
predictors of contaminated mindware. 
Factors that contribute to contaminated mindware 
Based on the literature reviewed, we have identified some important correlates of these 
three unwarranted beliefs, including cognitive ability, cognitive reflection, and AOT (e.g., 
Hartman et al., 2017; Pennycook, Gheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015a). These three 
aspects of System 2 processes are expected to be negatively associated with unwarranted beliefs. 
Although people become more sophisticated with age (Seplke & Kinzler, 2007), adults continue 
to show systematic biases in core knowledge (Lindeman 2018). Even young adults and adults 
blur the distinctions among the physical, mental, and biological worlds (Lindeman, 2011; 
Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012; Svedholm, Lindeman & Lipsanen, 2010). Ontological confusions 
are expected to be positively associated with unwarranted beliefs. The associations between 
these factors and unwarranted beliefs will be discussed in detail in the chapters to follow.   
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Understanding the role of these relevant factors in accumulating contaminated mindware 
across development will help us identify aspects of thinking and reasoning that can be developed 
and improved to protect against unwarranted beliefs. Measuring individual differences in 
unwarranted beliefs and identifying likely predictors among adolescents and young adults 
advances the study of these important unwarranted beliefs and sheds light on possible protective 
factors.  
Development and the study of contaminated mindware 
With development, individuals acquire information, beliefs, attitudes, and knowledge that 
vary in their level of substantiation to form one’s mindware. The study of contaminated 
mindware across development remains scarce compared to other aspects of cognition, although it 
has received a recent surge of attention for young adults and adults (e.g., Hartman et al., 2017; 
Jolley & Douglas, 2013; Lobato et al., 2014). However, very little has been done to study 
contaminated mindware or measure it in childhood and adolescence, leaving the current 
measurement tools underdeveloped for those developmental periods. Nonetheless, work has been 
conducted to understand beliefs about human knowledge and biases relevant to unwarranted 
beliefs as early as childhood.  
Past research has utilized self-report measures to examine how beliefs about what is true 
of the world and the nature of knowledge, known as epistemic beliefs, develop as we age (e.g., 
Boys & Chandler, 1992; Muis, Bendixen, & Haerle, 2006; Hallett, Chandler, & Krettenauer, 
2002; Schommer, 1990; 1993; Smith, Mcalin, Houghton, & Hennessey, 2000; Ricco, Pierce, & 
Medimilla, 2010). Adolescents and middle-school students recognize that scientific knowledge 
emerges from experimentation and investigation and is subject to revision based on new 
evidence (Conley et al., 2004; Hallet et al., 2002; Smith et al., 2000). These studies find 
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individual differences in the content of beliefs and knowledge acquisition and show that those 
aspects are measurable entities in adolescence. Further, although developmental scientists 
initially thought that ontological confusions to be a characteristic of childhood thinking, 
specifically, we now know that adolescents and adults also demonstrate similar confusions and 
biases (Bolton, Dearsley, Madronal-Luque, & Baron-Cohen, 2002; Lindeman, 2011; Lindeman 
& Svedholm, 201; Werner, 1948). As discussed previously, these confusions are important 
characteristics of paranormal beliefs and have been associated with other unwarranted beliefs. 
The prominence of these confusions beyond childhood and across development provides further 
support for the study of contaminated mindware in adolescence. 
To study individual differences in contaminated mindware in adolescence and adulthood, 
we assume the following: (1) individuals are exposed to information relevant to these 
unwarranted beliefs, and (2) there exist individual differences in these unwarranted beliefs. With 
respect to the former, adolescents are exposed to unwarranted beliefs from teachers (Eve & 
Dunn, 1990), through friends, family, and television programs (Preece & Baxter, 2000), and 
through the media and internet (Gleick, 2012). Thorburn and Bogart (2005) also discuss the role 
of sociocultural and historical factors in creating a distrust in the government and medical 
institutions, which precedes and reinforces conspiracy beliefs as early as adolescence. With 
respect to the latter, there is evidence that contaminated mindware happens as early as childhood 
and adolescence, warranting its study in those periods of development. For example, some 
research has assessed individual differences in paranormal beliefs in child and adolescent 
samples (e.g., Preece & Bexter, 2000; Kokis et al., 2002) and individual differences in specific 
conspiracies in adolescence (e.g., Bogart & Thorburn, 2006; Thorburn & Bogart, 2005). Taken 
together, there is evidence that adolescents are exposed to and, to varying extents, have 
	 14	
accumulated some unwarranted beliefs. In this dissertation we build on existing work to develop 
the necessary measurement tools needed to study unwarranted beliefs in adolescence and young 
adulthood.   
Why study unwarranted beliefs as early as adolescence? 
Unwarranted beliefs should be studied at early developmental stages because these 
beliefs are acquired domains and exposure increases with age (Stanovich, 2009). However, there 
is not much research with adolescents and this is especially concerning because the use of the 
Internet and social media has increased over the last decade (Anderson, Steen, & Stavropoulos, 
2016; Gottfried & Shearer, 2016), and are platforms for spreading misinformation and 
unwarranted beliefs (Evans, 1996; Gleick, 2012; Sparks & Pellechia, 1997). The digital 
revolution has changed the way adolescents learn and communicate in the past 15 years, at rates 
that surpass any changes that have taken place in the preceding hundreds of years (Giedd, 2012). 
There is a growing need to process abundant information automatically and intuitively, 
increasing the likelihood of accumulating unwarranted beliefs. Further, with increased 
automaticity and intuition, one tends to rely more heavily on prior beliefs and knowledge, 
including contaminated mindware, rather than inviting deliberation and reflection. Therefore, it 
is important to help young people better evaluate and filter information in the media (Giedd, 
2012; Potter, 2004). For example, increased exposure to television content on science fiction, 
astrology, fortune-telling, and alternative therapy is associated with increased beliefs in those 
domains (Tseng, Tsai, Hsieh, Hung, & Huang, 2014). Exposure to fake news headlines also 
increases beliefs in such news, particularly when relying on System 1 processes (Pennycook, 
Cannon, & Rand, 2017).  
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No research has yet examined all three domains of contaminated mindware in 
adolescence. There is even less work on the suitability of the measurement tools used to assess 
individual differences in unwarranted beliefs in adolescence, or whether such tools would be 
appropriate for cross-sectional or longitudinal analysis. Therefore, we furthered the study of 
contaminated mindware by using the same set of items to measure these beliefs in both 
adolescence and young adulthood.  
A summary of the current project 
The accumulation of contaminated mindware is a function of both the structure of these 
beliefs and the person that holds them (Boudry & Braeckman, 2012). Therefore, it is important to 
empirically investigate the underlying structure of unwarranted beliefs, as well as the likely 
predictors of these beliefs in young-adult and adolescent samples. The current project had three 
overarching objectives: (1) examine the underlying dimensional structure of  contaminated 
mindware among young adults and adolescents; (2) examine the effect of individual differences 
in cognitive ability, cognitive reflection, AOT, and ontological confusions on contaminated 
mindware among young adults and adolescents; and (3) assess developmental differences in 
unwarranted beliefs. We conducted three studies using two samples to address these objectives.  
In Study One, we compiled and adapted items from the literature assessing individual 
differences in unwarranted beliefs (i.e., paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science). We sampled 
items from several scales used in the literature and adapted them for reading ease and 
appropriateness for both adolescent and young-adult samples. This endeavor was important 
because the measurement tools in the literature have mostly been developed for use with adult 
samples, limiting the research that can be done with adolescents. To examine how well the items 
measure the constructs of interest, we examined the dimensional structure underlying the 
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associations among these items using a young-adult sample. We also examined the reliability of 
the observed scale scores implied by the model that presented with optimal fit to ensure that 
those scores represent reliable variance in unwarranted beliefs. Based on theory, we tested three 
competing confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) models to determine which provides the best 
representation of the dimensional structure of the proposed items. We then expanded the CFA 
model of optimal fit into a structural regression model to examine how strongly individual 
difference variables (i.e., cognitive ability, cognitive reflection, AOT, and ontological 
confusions) were associated with the factors underlying individual differences in unwarranted 
beliefs.   
Study Two replicated the Study One analyses but instead used an adolescent sample. 
Specifically, we estimated the three CFA models tested in Study One in order to assess whether 
the same model presented with optimal fit in both a young-adult and adolescent sample. In 
addition, we examined the reliability of the observed scale scores implied by the model that 
presented with optimal fit. We then expanded the CFA model to a structural regression model to 
examine the associations between individual difference variables (i.e., cognitive ability, 
cognitive reflection, AOT, and ontological confusions) and the factors underlying unwarranted 
beliefs using an adolescent sample. 
In Study Three, we merged the samples from the first two studies to assess measurement 
invariance of the items as a function of developmental period (adolescence vs. young adulthood). 
Measurement invariance assesses whether the scale indexes the construct of interest equivalently 
across sub-populations (Reise, Widaman, & Pugh, 1993). This investigation removes ambiguity 
about whether differences between adolescent and young adults can be attributed to true 
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developmental differences or are merely measurement differences. We then examined cross-
sectional and developmental differences for the three domains of unwarranted beliefs.  
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Chapter 2: An examination of the underlying structure and common correlates of three 
domains of contaminated mindware in a sample of young adults 
 
Citation: Rizeq, J., Flora, D. B., & Toplak, M. E. (under review). An examination of the underlying 
dimensional structure of three domains of contaminated mindware: Paranormal, conspiracy 
and anti-science beliefs. Thinking and Reasoning.  
 
Research examining concurrent associations among the three domains of contaminated 
mindware remains scarce, despite the prevalence of these beliefs. Examining these associations 
is important for our understanding of the structure of individual differences in unwarranted 
beliefs and, more importantly, for how to best measure it. The current research focused on 
paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs. In this study, we examined the underlying 
dimensional structure of these three categories of contaminated mindware in a sample of young-
adults. This examination furthers our understanding of the co-occurring nature of those beliefs. 
We also assessed individual differences that may make some people more susceptible to 
endorsing these beliefs than others, namely cognitive ability, AOT, cognitive reflection, and 
ontological confusions.  
Associations among the three unwarranted beliefs in young-adults and adults 
As noted earlier, research has mainly focused on examining the domains of contaminated 
mindware separately or in pairs, with a focus on bivariate associations rather than the underlying 
factor structure. Specifically, positive associations have been observed among paranormal beliefs 
and belief in alternative medicine (van den Bulck & Custers, 2010), and conspiracy beliefs and 
rejection of scientific claims (Lewandowsky et al., 2013a; 2013b). Further, belief in paranormal 
phenomena is associated with belief in specific conspiracy theories (Darwin et al., 2011; 
Drinkwater et al., 2012) and generic conspiracist ideation or mentality (Bruder et al., 2013; 
Drinkwater et al., 2012). Two studies examined all three domains, using young-adult and adult 
samples, and both only examined bivariate associations. In one study, anti-science attitudes, as 
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measured by individuals’ perception of the credibility of science, were positively associated with 
paranormal and conspiracy beliefs (Hartman et al., 2017). In another, positive associations were 
observed among paranormal, conspiracy, and specific pseudoscientific beliefs (Lobato et al., 
2014).  
Overall, the concurrence among these different domains of contaminated mindware has 
been supported. However, the underlying structure of contaminated mindware items remains 
unexplored. We examined the underlying dimensional structure of these belief items to 
determine whether a unidimensional or multidimensional factor structure better represents the 
associations among these domains of unwarranted beliefs. Further, we examined possible 
predictors of these unwarranted beliefs to help validate the dimensional structure and assess the 
role of individual difference variables.  
Correlates and predictors of unwarranted beliefs in young-adults and adults 
Intelligent people accumulate contaminated mindware (Stanovich, 2009) and so deficits 
in knowledge or cognitive ability cannot fully explain the endorsement of unwarranted beliefs 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2013; Browne et al., 2015). Despite the accepted notion that even 
intelligent people believe in the unbelievable, research has yet to examine the unique effects of 
cognitive ability alongside other aspects of reasoning which may explain variation in the 
endorsement of unwarranted beliefs. Unwarranted beliefs are associated with performance on 
rational thinking tasks and measures of AOT. Specifically, AOT is negatively associated with 
specific unwarranted beliefs, including anti-science beliefs and attitudes, conspiracy beliefs, and 
paranormal beliefs (Stanovich et al., 2016; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013a; Swami, Voracek, 
Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014). Further, cognitive biases captured by ontological confusions or 
mistakes are associated with greater endorsement of paranormal and conspiracy beliefs, and 
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belief in alternative and complementary medicine (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Lobato et al., 
2014). Belief in alternative medicine and the paranormal are also negatively correlated with 
aspects of rational thinking, as measured by a set of tasks that measure heuristics and biases 
(Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015a). Cognitive reflection is also associated 
with perceiving science as credible (Hartman et al., 2017). Taken together, these findings support 
the negative association between unwarranted beliefs and System 2 processes and dispositions. 
On the other hand, System 1 processes are associated with the accumulation of unwarranted 
beliefs. However, the unique effects of these multiple predictors has yet to be assessed 
concurrently in a multivariate model, controlling for indices of cognitive ability. 
Study One 
Not until recently has research attempted a concurrent examination of the three domains 
of unwarranted beliefs (see Hartman et al., 2017; Lobato et al., 2014). Lobato and colleagues 
(2014) examined bivariate associations among the three domains and suggested that those beliefs 
may have a unitary underlying structure. Stanovich and colleagues (2016) examined the factor 
structure of the Comprehensive Assessment of Rational Thinking (CART), a prototype measure 
of rational thinking subtests that includes superstitious thinking, generic anti-science attitudes, 
and specific conspiracy beliefs. Those three subtests of the CART were influenced by a single 
latent factor. To build on this research, we examined the dimensional structure of the three 
unwarranted belief domains of contaminated mindware by modeling the associations among 
those beliefs.  
We first compiled items measuring unwarranted beliefs from the literature. In order to 
confirm that these items were representative of the content domain (Cizek, 2012), colleagues in 
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developmental psychology evaluated their representativeness. They also provided feedback on 
whether the items were suitable for use with adolescents.  
Three separate CFA models were estimated to test competing hypotheses regarding the 
latent structure of these three domains of unwarranted beliefs. CFA models are measurement 
models that represent the associations between observed variables and a smaller number of latent 
variables or factors (Flora, 2017). In our case, the patterns of associations are among sets of 
items purported to measure three unwarranted beliefs and their respective latent variable. The 
regression coefficients in a CFA model (i.e., factor loadings) represent the strength of the causal 
relation between the factor and its respective items. The general matrix form of the CFA models 
is Y = Λη + ε, where: 
Y is a vector of the J observed variables,  
Λ is a J × M matrix of factor loadings,  
η is a vector of M common factors,  
ε is a vector of J unique factors  
 First, we tested a one-factor model of unwarranted beliefs to examine whether the 
associations among unwarranted belief items might be explained by a single underlying variable. 
Second, to examine the multidimensional nature of unwarranted belief items, we estimated a 
model with three correlated factors, one for each domain. Most research reviewed conceptualizes 
each of the separate domains of contaminated mindware as unidimensional in nature, with 
correlations among these unidimensional domains (e.g., Bruder et al., 2013; Hartman et al., 
2017). Unidimensional means that the associations among the items in a measure are a result of 
one underlying factor representing the respective belief being studied. Third, because the 
paranormal items are multifaceted and sample multiple aspects of the broader paranormal beliefs 
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domain (Lindeman and Svedholm, 2012), we tested a hierarchical model. The hierarchical model 
consisted of three general factors for paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs, along with 
five specific factors representing different sub-domains of paranormal beliefs, namely 
spiritualism, superstition, witchcraft, psi, and precognition. The paranormal domain tested in the 
latter model is similar to the structure of the Australian Sheep-Goat Scale and the Revised 
Paranormal Belief Scale (see Drinkwater, Denovan, Dagnall, & Parker, 2017;2018). Figure 1 
shows generic forms of the three CFA models estimated. 
We expanded the CFA model that obtained the best fit into a structural regression model 
to examine the unique effects of cognitive ability, cognitive reflection, AOT, and ontological 
confusions on the latent variables of contaminated mindware. This examination helps uncover 
how aspects of thinking and reasoning uniquely contribute to the accumulation of contaminated 
mindware. 
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Figure 1. Generic CFA models tested 
1a. Unidimensional model                      
     1b. Three-factor model                 
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 1c. Hierarchical model 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Data were taken from 321 participants recruited through an undergraduate student 
research portal and participants received course credit for their participation. There were 58 
males and 263 females and their age ranged between 18 and 30 years (M = 19.36, SD = 2.09). Of 
the total sample, 29.9% identified as South Asian, 25.5% as White/Caucasian, 8.7% as Black or 
African American, 7.8% as Arab or Middle Eastern, 6.9% as East Asian, 6.5% as South East 
Asian, 1.9% as Hispanic or Latino, 0.6% as Central Asian, 12.1% as other, and 0.6% chose not 
to disclose their ethnic identity. The majority of participants identified as Christian (40.2%), 
18.7% as Muslim, 10.3% as Hindu, 6.2% as Agnostic, 2.5% Buddhist, 1.2% as Jewish, and 
16.5% with a different religion, whereas 4.4% chose not to disclose.  
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Three hundred and fifty-nine participants were recruited originally. Data from 31 
participants were discarded because of random responding, identified using the five-item 
Conscientious Responders Scale (CRS; Marjanovic, Struthers, Cribbie, & Greenglass, 2014). 
These attention check items were mixed in with the unwarranted beliefs items and instructed 
participants to respond with a specific option (e.g., response option 3); they were scored as either 
correct or incorrect. In the original CRS paper a 7-item scale was used and the cutoff for random 
responding was a score lower than 3. Because we used a 6-point likert scale, a cutoff score of 4 
was used, such that participants who scored lower than 4 were considered random responders 
and their data was excluded. Of the remaining 327 participants, 6 participants were older than 30 
and their data were excluded from further analyses because of this study’s focus on young adults. 
Analyses were only conducted on the final sample of 321 participants.  
Measures 
For all rating-scale measures (i.e., paranormal beliefs, generic conspiracy, anti-science 
beliefs and attitudes, and AOT scales), participants rated how much they agree with statements 
on a six-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = disagree, 4 
= agree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = strongly agree).  
Contaminated mindware. The full list of paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science items is in 
Appendix A, including the breakdown of the paranormal items by sub-domain.  
Paranormal beliefs. Paranormal beliefs were measured using 35 items, which were 
adapted from several extant scales measuring paranormal belief in adults (Epstein & Meier, 
1989; Lobato et al., 2014; Tobacyk, 2004), children, and adolescents (Bolton, Dearsley, 
Madronal‐Luque, & Baron‐Cohen, 2002; Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2002; 
Preece & Bester, 2000). Of the 35 items, four represented belief in Psi (e.g., psychokinesis), four 
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represented belief in witchcraft (e.g., spells and black magic), eight represented superstition (e.g., 
lucky numbers), eight represented spiritualism (e.g. communication with the deceased), and five 
items represented precognition (e.g., astrology’s ability to predict the future). One item 
represented extraterrestrial activity and five items were generated based on belief in characters 
from modern fiction that represent extraordinary life forms, some of which possess supernatural 
powers (e.g., Hobbits really exist). These life forms were considered more timely than other 
folklore figures such as Bigfoot or the Loch Ness monster. The number of items per sub-domain 
were determined by availability of content in the extant scales examined. Participants were 
instructed to rate how much they agree with each statement. Higher scores indicate greater 
endorsements of paranormal belief.  
Generic conspiracy beliefs. Conspiracy beliefs were measured using items adapted from 
the generic conspiracy belief scale (Brotherton et al., 2013). Twelve items were used which 
asked about the occurrence and normalcy of conspiracies in the real world without providing 
context or cues to any specific historical events (e.g., “The government is secretly involved in 
the murder of innocent citizens and a small secret group of people control world events”). Higher 
scores indicate greater endorsements of conspiracy belief.  
  Generic anti-science beliefs and attitudes. Items assessing anti-science beliefs and 
attitudes were adapted from Stanovich et al. (2016). Ten items were included asking about one’s 
beliefs and attitudes towards science and preference for intuition (e.g., “I tend to rely on my gut 
feeling even when it contradicts a scientific finding” and “Evidence from science is usually 
biased or wrong”). Higher scores indicate greater endorsement of anti-science beliefs and 
attitudes. 
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Actively open-minded thinking. The 30-item Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale 
was used to measure AOT (Stanovich et al., 2016). The scale measures participants’ disposition 
to take evidence into account even when it contradicts one’s preferred conclusion or belief (e.g., 
“Changing your mind is a sign of weakness” (reverse scored) and “People should always 
consider evidence that goes against their beliefs”). The one factor underlying the positive 
associations among AOT items had an omega of .801.  
Cognitive reflection. The expanded seven-item version of the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT; originally from Frederick, 2005; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014) was used. These 
problems elicit an intuitive incorrect response that participants need to override to obtain the 
correct answer. Each item was scored as correct (1) or incorrect (0), with a possible total score of 
7. Higher scores are indicative of better performance. The one factor underlying performance on 
all seven problems of the CRT had an omega of .79.  
Ontological confusion. The 30-item Ontological Confusions scale was used to measure 
ontological confusion (Lindeman & Aranio, 2007; Lindeman et al., 2011; Svedholm & 
Lindeman, 2013). The items on the scale assesses six content domains of ontological confusions, 
each with five confusion statements. The six domains are: Natural, lifeless objects are living; 
Force is living and animate; Lifeless objects are animate; Living inanimate entities (e.g., plants) 
are animate; Artificial objects are animate; And mental states are material objects. Example 
items include “stars live in the sky” which is from the domain of natural, lifeless objects are 
living and “earth wants water” from the domain of lifeless objects are animate. Participants were 
 
1 Coefficient alpha assumes “essential tau equivalence,” implying equal factor loadings across items. Therefore, 
reliability was estimated using McDonald’s (1999) coefficient omega for all of the total scores used in this research 
project. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to estimate one-factor models for all scales in order to obtain 
reliability estimates for the total scores used in the study. The one-factor model fit the data well for all the measures, 
except in the case of the AOT scale. A hierarchical AOT model was also tested but the fit of the model remained 
poor. Therefore, the reliability of the total AOT score should be interpreted cautiously as poor model fit might 
inflate omega values.  
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asked whether the statements are literally true or not literally true. Before asking participants to 
rate the literal truth of the statements, they were provided with an example to explain the 
difference in meaning between literally true and metaphorically or not literally true: “Do you 
think the following statements can be literally true, the way a sentence such as ‘Wayne Gretzky 
was a hockey player’ is true? Or are they true only in a metaphorical sense, like the expression 
‘Friends are the salt of life?” (Pennycook et al., 2015a). Answers were coded as either 1 (correct) 
or 0 (incorrect) and a higher total score was indicative of better performance and less ontological 
confusion (Omega for an ontological confusions factor was .93). There were also eight filler 
statements (four metaphors and four literal statements) which were not included in the 
ontological confusion score.  
Verbal and nonverbal reasoning. Verbal reasoning was assessed using the checklist-
with-foils format. The test included 40 words and 20 pronounceable nonwords, taken largely 
from Zimmerman et al. (1977). The words and nonwords were intermixed through 
alphabetization. Participants were told that some of the letter strings were actual words and that 
others were not, and that their task was to put a check mark next to those that they knew to be 
words. The total score was obtained by subtracting the number of foils checked (i.e., nonwords) 
from the sum of correctly identified words. This measure has been shown to be a reliable and 
valid way of assessing individual differences in vocabulary knowledge (R. C. Anderson & 
Freebody, 1983; Cooksey & Freebody, 1987; Zimmerman, Broder, Shaughnessy, & Underwood, 
1977). The omega for the factor explaining positive associations among the identified words in 
the correct item pool was .92. The omega for the factor representing the associations among 
incorrectly identified words (i.e., foils or nonwords) among the pool of nonwords was .80. 
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To assess non-verbal reasoning, the 18-item short form of Raven’s Advanced Progressive 
Matrices (APM) was used. Participants were presented with an abstract visual design that had a 
portion missing. The participants’ task was to choose the missing portion from eight alternatives.  
Support for the use of this short form has been established by multiple studies (Arthur & Day, 
1994; Chiesi, Ciancaleoni, Galli, Morsanyi & Primi, 2012). Each item was scored as correct (1) 
or incorrect (0), with a maximum possible total score of 18 (omega for the one-factor nonverbal 
reasoning was .67). 
The raw scores on these two subtests were converted into z-scores and summed to create 
a composite measure of cognitive ability for use in the analyses. A higher score indicates greater 
cognitive ability.  
Procedure 
 
 Participants completed the study online using Qualtrics software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). 
Upon consent, participants were presented with a battery of questionnaires and tests in the 
following order: CRT, a block of paranormal items and AOT items intermixed and presented in a 
randomized order, Raven’s APM, a block of conspiracy items in a randomized order, OCS, a 
block of anti-science items presented in a randomized order, demographic questionnaire, and the 
Vocabulary Checklist. We chose this order to switch between performance-based and rating 
measures whenever possible, to keep the participants engaged. The attention check items were 
intermixed within blocks with the unwarranted beliefs items.   
Data Analysis 
 
First, we calculated item-level descriptive statistics to assess the most and least prevalent 
contaminated mindware beliefs in the sample. We retained only those items that elicit variability 
in responses (more than 10% endorsement of either agree or disagree dimensions) in the 
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subsequent factor analyses. To address the first goal, CFA was used to model the dimensional 
structure of individual differences in unwarranted belief items. We then removed items with 
smaller factor loading estimates to create scales more succinctly representative of contaminated 
mindware. Then we calculated correlations among these unwarranted belief scales and other 
individual-difference variables. Finally, we extended the CFA model to a structural equation 
model (SEM) to measure the unique effects of each of the other individual-difference variables 
on the general factors of contaminated mindware estimated in the CFA model.  
All models were estimated using R software with the lavaan package (version 0.5-17; 
Rosseel, 2012). Maximum likelihood estimation was used with robust standard errors and fit 
statistics to adjust for multivariate non-normality (Yuan & Bentler, 2000). Model fit was 
evaluated using the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), the root mean square error 
of approximation (RMSEA), the comparative-fit index (CFI), and the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI). 
Hu and Bentler (1999) recommend values lower than .08 for the SRMR and .06 for the RMSEA 
and a value close to .95 or above for CFI and TLI to indicate acceptable model fit. Less rigorous 
guidelines have been proposed by others, in which values of .90 or greater for CFI and TLI are 
acceptable (Kline, 2011), along with values smaller than .08 for the RMSEA (MacCallum, 
Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). 
Results 
CFA Models of the Structure of Contaminated Mindware Items 
Before running the CFA models, the frequency of the individual contaminated mindware 
items were examined. Items that were endorsed by less than 10% of the sample for either the 
agree or disagree dimensions were removed. This resulted in 4 of the paranormal and 2 of the 
anti-science items being removed (i.e., “bad things happen when you step on a crack on the 
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pavement”, “zombies can really be found in graveyards after midnight”, “werewolves are real 
living people during the daytime”, “mermaids really live in the ocean near the South Pacific”, 
“scientific understanding gets better over the years”, “science is based on measuring observable 
events in the world and this has led to important knowledge”).  
 The hierarchical model described earlier, with three general factors of paranormal, 
conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs and five specific factors (i.e., psi, spiritualism, precognition, 
witchcraft, and superstition) fit the data (CFI = .85, TLI = .84, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .07) 
better than the three-factor model (CFI = .80, TLI = .79, RMSEA = .07, SRMR = .07) and one-
factor model (CFI = .60, TLI = .58, RMSEA = .09, SRMR = .10)2. Based on these results, we 
reduced the number of items to improve model fit of the hierarchical model: for the revised 
model, we retained items with completely standardized factor loadings of .60 or higher on their 
respective general factor. 
Revised Hierarchical model of contaminated mindware items 
The revised model was specified for 20 paranormal items, eight conspiracy items, and 
five anti-science items. This hierarchical model with three general factors and four specific 
factors (i.e., psi, precognition, spiritualism, and superstition) fit the data well (CFI = .91, TLI = 
.90, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .06). In the revised model, among the paranormal items only one 
witchcraft item was retained and two conspiracy items were allowed to covary because of a 
strong residual correlation (r = .34) (“The government hides information and facts to trick the 
public” and “The government blames other people to hide its criminal activity”). Table 1 
 
2 The same three models were also estimated using the full item list. Results were similar: The hierarchical model fit 
the data (CFI = .83, TLI = .82, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .08) better than the three-factor model (CFI = .76, TLI = 
.75, RMSEA = .07, SRMR = .08) and one-factor model (CFI = .60, TLI = .57, RMSEA = .09, SRMR = .10). 
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presents the completely standardized general factor loadings and the proportion of item-level 
variance explained by the revised model. 
The three contaminated mindware factors were positively correlated with each other: The 
paranormal general factor was moderately correlated with the anti-science (r = .43) and 
conspiracy factors (r = .34), ps <.001, and the anti-science and conspiracy factors were also 
moderately correlated (r = .38, p <.001). Further, the total score reliabilities of the three general 
factors were good. The general paranormal factor has an omega of .93 and the conspiracy and 
anti-science factors have omegas of .89 and .79 respectively, indicating that the three general 
factors represent reliable variance in their respective items (for further discussion on the 
interpretation of statistical indices in bifactor models, see Rodrigues, Reise, & Haviland, 2016).  
Table 1. General factor standardized factor loadings and proportion of variance explained in the 
revised hierarchical model  
General Factor 
Item 
Standardized 
factor loadings 
Proportion of 
variance 
explained 
Paranormal   
Some people can lift objects using the power from 
their minds 
.69 .63 
A person’s thoughts can influence the movement of a 
physical object 
.60 .61 
Witches really exist and practice their magical powers 
in certain parts of the world 
.60 .36 
If you break a mirror, you will have bad luck .73 .57 
Some numbers are unlucky  .65 .75 
Your mind or soul can leave your body and travel 
(astral projection) 
.65 .95 
During altered states, such as sleep or trances, the 
spirit can leave the body 
.61 .51 
It is possible to communicate with the dead .61 .38 
Astrology is a way to accurately predict the future .78 .62 
Horoscopes accurately predict the future .76 .57 
Some psychics can accurately predict the future .77 .62 
Some people have an unexplained ability to predict the 
future 
.74 .87 
You can prevent something bad from happening by 
just touching wood 
.62 .48 
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Certain objects, such as rabbit’s feet and four-leafed 
clovers, are known to bring good luck 
.68 .48 
Astrology is a valid explanation for the behaviors and 
personality of people 
.76 .58 
Dead people can communicate with living people 
through séances or Ouija boards 
.70 .49 
Some numbers and dates are more lucky or unlucky 
than others 
.68 .70 
Certain types of crystals have special powers .70 .50 
Hobbits really exist .60 .36 
Some people have a “sixth sense” that allows them to 
accurately predict the future 
.71 .58 
   
Conspiracy   
The government is secretly involved in the murder of 
innocent citizens 
.71 .50 
The spread of certain diseases is secretly caused by 
certain organizations 
.79 .62 
The government hides information and facts to trick 
the public 
.62 .38 
A secret organization is responsible for making all 
major world decisions, such as going to war 
.78 .61 
The government blames other people to hide its 
criminal activity 
.62 .39 
A small secret group of people control world events .73 .53 
The government routinely tries new drugs on people 
without them knowing 
.81 .65 
Scientists routinely hide important information from 
the public to protect their jobs 
.60 .37 
   
Anti-science   
I tend to rely on my gut feeling even when it 
contradicts a scientific finding 
.61 .37 
Evidence from science is usually biased or wrong .70 .49 
Because scientists disagree with each other, this shows 
that science is about the personal opinions of scientists 
more than actual evidence 
.67 .45 
Your gut feeling is better than relying on science in 
making decisions  
.63 .40 
I don’t rely on findings from science because scientific 
facts can be used to prove anything  
.69 .48 
Note. N = 321. 
 
 Revised hierarchical model with a general unwarranted beliefs factor. In order to 
further explore the dimensional nature of these unwarranted beliefs and directly assess the 
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reliability of a unitary general factor, we examined a general unwarranted beliefs factor. 
Specifically, we estimated a hierarchical model with a general unwarranted beliefs factor along 
with the three specific factors for paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs, accounting 
for residual correlations in the three specific domains (in addition to specific factors for psi, 
precognition, spiritualism, and superstition). The model fit the data well (CFI = .94, TLI = .93, 
RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .05). The three factors of paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science 
beliefs and attitudes had omegas of .06, .76, and .62 and the unwarranted beliefs general factor 
had an omega of .81. Notably, the general factor’s high omega is mainly due to the paranormal 
items having high standardized general factor loadings (ranging from .58 to .75) in contrast to 
the conspiracy and anti-science items having lower standardized general factor loadings (ranging 
from .12 to .42), meaning that the general unwarranted beliefs factor is actually a paranormal 
factor (for a discussion on anomalous results in bifactor models, see Eid, Geiser, Koch, & Heene, 
2017). Therefore, the model without the general unwarranted beliefs factor is preferred, because 
its factor structure is a better representation of reliable variance in the items.  
Total Scale Score Descriptive Statistics  
 
Descriptive statistics are in Table 2 for all total scale scores, including the unwarranted 
beliefs scales based on the factors of the revised CFA model with three correlated general 
factors. All variables were approximately normally distributed with values of skewness and 
kurtosis near zero. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of total scale scores 
Variable Mean SD Observed 
range 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Predicted correlates      
Ravens 5.79 3.42 0, 15 0.51 -0.46 
Vocabulary Checklist 18.37 7.45 -2, 40 0.67 0.60 
Cognitive ability 
composite  
0.00 1.57 -3.51, 4.64 0.30 -0.29 
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CRT 2.25 2.09 0, 7 0.86 -0.38 
AOT  120.51 13.14 90, 156 0.58 -0.26 
OCS  17.68 7.63 0, 30 -0.25 -0.63 
Contaminated 
mindware 
     
Paranormal 51.79 19.08 20, 119 -0.02 -0.77 
Conspiracy 27.26 8.04 8, 48 0.03 0.13 
Anti-science 14.77 3.90 5, 30 -0.33 0.23 
Note. CRT  = Cognitive Reflection Test; AOT = Actively Open-Minded Thinking; OCS = Ontological Confusions 
Scale. 
 
Bivariate Correlations 
  
Correlations among scale scores are presented in Table 3. As expected, cognitive ability, 
CRT, AOT, and OCS were all positively correlated, with correlations ranging from .22 to .37, all 
ps < .05. Further, cognitive ability, CRT, AOT, and OCS were all negatively associated with the 
unwarranted beliefs, with correlations between -.14 and -.56, all ps < .05.  Finally, as 
hypothesized, the paranormal beliefs, conspiracy beliefs, and anti-science beliefs and attitudes 
scores were all positively associated (rs from .30 to .39). 
Table 3. Correlations among all variables and their respective 95% confidence intervals 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Cognitive ability 1 
 
      
2. CRT .30 
(.20, .40) 
1      
3. AOT3 .34 
(.24, .43) 
.22 
(.12, .32) 
1     
4. OCS .31 
(.21, .41) 
.28 
(.18, .38) 
.37 
(.27, .46) 
1    
5. Paranormal -.14 
(-.24, -.03) 
-.22 
(-.32, -.11) 
-.44 
(-.53, -.35) 
-.32 
(-.42, -.22) 
1   
6. Conspiracy -.15 
(-.26, -.04) 
-.18 
(-.28, -.07) 
-.20 
(-.30, -.09) 
-.22 
(-.33, -.12) 
.32 
(.22, .41) 
1  
7. Anti-science -.23 
(-.33, -.12) 
-.19 
(-.29, -.08) 
-.56 
(-.63, -.48) 
-.33 
(-.43, -.23) 
.39 
(.29, .48) 
.30 
(.20, .40) 
1 
 
3 We also calculated correlations using a revised 23-item AOT scale which excludes the belief items from the 
original scale (see Stanovich and Toplak, 2019), which yielded similar results. Specifically, the revised 23-item 
AOT scale was positively associated with cognitive ability (r = .31, p < .05), CRT (r = .20, p < .05), and OCS (r = 
.34, p < .05), and negatively correlated with beliefs in the paranormal (r = -.41, p < .05) and conspiracy (r = -.19, p 
<.05) and anti-science attitudes (r = - .54, p < .05).  
 
	 36	
Note. All correlations are significant p < .05. CRT Cognitive Reflection Test; AOT Actively Open-Minded 
Thinking; OCS Ontological Confusions Scale. 
 
Structural Equation Model Results 
 
The structural equation model shown in Figure 2 had acceptable fit to the data (CFI = .91, 
TLI = .90, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .06). The set of individual-difference variables (cognitive 
ability, CRT, AOT4, and OCS) explained 24.8% of the variance in the paranormal beliefs latent 
variable, 9.5% for conspiracy beliefs, and 41.3% for anti-science beliefs and attitudes. AOT and 
OCS were statistically significant unique predictors of the paranormal beliefs latent variable, p < 
.001 and p = .003, respectively. AOT and OCS also predicted the anti-science attitudes latent 
variable, p < .001 and p = .012, respectively. Only OCS was a unique predictor of the conspiracy 
beliefs latent variable, p = .004. Cognitive ability and cognitive reflection did not predict any of 
the three unwarranted beliefs. Table 4 presents the unstandardized path coefficients and their 
respective 95% confidence intervals. Comparing standardized path coefficient estimates (see 
Figure 2), AOT was the strongest predictor of both paranormal beliefs and anti-science beliefs 
and attitudes, such that higher AOT scores predicted higher disagreement with those beliefs. 
Greater ontological confusions predicted more endorsement for all three unwarranted beliefs.  
Table 4. SEM unstandardized path coefficients and 95% confidence interval  
Outcome Variable Predictor 
Variable 
Unstandardized Path 
Coefficient 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Paranormal    
 Cognitive ability 0.06 -0.02, 0.14 
 CRT -0.06 -.12, 0.00 
 AOT -0.03 -0.05, -0.02 
 OCS -0.03 -0.05, -0.01 
Conspiracy    
 Cognitive ability -0.03 -0.11, 0.05 
 CRT -0.05 -0.10, 0.01 
 
4 The structural equation model was also estimated using the 23-item AOT scale, excluding the 7 belief 
identification items (see Stanovich and Toplak, 2019 for further discussion of the issue), and had adequate fit to the 
data (CFI = .91, TLI = .90, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .06). The 23-item AOT significantly predicted paranormal 
beliefs (B* = -.35, p <.001), anti-science attitudes (B* = -0.53, p < .001), and conspiracy beliefs (B* = -0.13, p < 
.05). 
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 AOT -0.01 -0.01, 0.00 
 OCS -0.02 -0.04, -0.01 
Anti-Science    
 Cognitive ability -0.01 -0.12, 0.09 
 CRT -0.02 -0.09, 0.05 
 AOT -0.06 -0.07, -0.04 
 OCS -0.03 -0.05, -0.01 
 
 
Discussion 
In the current study, we examined the dimensional structure of individual differences in 
three unwarranted beliefs (i.e., paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science). We also examined the 
unique effects of cognitive ability, CRT, AOT, and OCS on these domains in a young-adult 
sample. This study advances research on positive associations among unwarranted beliefs 
(Lobato et al., 2014), by examining the underlying variables causing these positive associations 
among observable belief measures. The hierarchical model with three correlated general factors 
	 38	
for each unwarranted belief, along with specific factors for 4 aspects of paranormal beliefs, had 
the best fit. Further, these unwarranted beliefs were uniquely associated with aspects of cognition 
other than ability, including cognitive biases (i.e., ontological confusions) and thinking 
dispositions (i.e., AOT).  
Based on the results from the two hierarchical models with and without a general 
unwarranted beliefs factor, the current findings support the multidimensional structure of the 
three contaminated mindware domains as measured by our items. The multidimensional structure 
constitutes three correlated general factors of paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs, 
with four specific factors accounting for excess covariation among items representing specific 
aspects of paranormal belief. Results from a hierarchical model with a general unwarranted 
beliefs factor did not support a unitary construct of unwarranted beliefs, with the general factor 
loadings indicating that it is essentially a paranormal belief factor. Our results address Lobato 
and colleagues’ (2014) question of whether those three domains of belief have a unified 
underlying structure despite their superficial differences. Specifically, our CFA results suggest 
that those beliefs items do not represent a unidimensional latent factor and, instead, the 
underlying structure of those items consists of correlated, yet separate, factors based on the three 
domains (i.e., paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science). The implication is that differences 
among those beliefs are the result of their distinct underlying dimensions, whose 
intercorrelations partially explain the commonalities among those unwarranted beliefs, such as 
their self-validating nature and ease of propagation. However, based on the results, equating 
those beliefs is misleading and can lead to suboptimal measurement of the constructs of interest. 
Therefore, researchers should sample items across all three domains if they are interested in 
measuring the three domains examined here. 
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In terms of common correlates, higher cognitive ability and better performance on the 
CRT were weakly associated with lower endorsement of the three domains of contaminated 
mindware, with correlations ranging between -.14 and -.23 and between -.18 and -.22, 
respectively. Also as expected, higher AOT and lower ontological confusions were associated 
with lower endorsement of the three domains of contaminated mindware, with correlations 
ranging between -.20 and -.56 and between -.23 and - .34, respectively. Based on the structural 
model, neither cognitive ability nor performance on the CRT uniquely predicted the unwarranted 
beliefs scales over and above AOT and ontological confusions. These results provide evidence 
that ability and capacity are not the determinants of unwarranted beliefs, when entered alongside 
AOT and OCS scales, consistent with suggestions posed in previous research (e.g., Browne et al. 
2015; Lewandowsky et al., 2013). More importantly, the results support the notion that even 
intelligent people believe in the unbelievable (Stanovich, 2009; Stanovich et al., 2016).  
On the other hand, AOT and ontological confusions or biases were unique predictors of 
unwarranted beliefs scales in the structural model. Specifically, higher AOT scores predicted 
lower endorsement of paranormal and anti-science beliefs, whereas higher ontological 
confusions predicted greater endorsement of all three unwarranted beliefs. These results replicate 
and extend previous research (e.g., Lindeman, Svedholm-Häkkinen, & Lipsanen, 2015; Lobato 
et al., 2014; Pennycook et al., 2015a; Stanovich et al., 2016; Swami et al, 2014). 
Summary of findings in Study One 
 In Study One we found support for the utility of questionnaire items reflecting three 
domains of unwarranted beliefs in a young-adult sample. We also demonstrated that individual 
differences in ontological confusions and actively open-minded thinking are uniquely associated 
with endorsement of unwarranted beliefs in young adults, independent of cognitive ability and 
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reflection. In Study Two we extend this examination to a sample of adolescents using the same 
questionnaire items. 
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Chapter 3: Confirming the structure and common correlates of three domains of 
contaminated mindware in a sample of adolescents  
Citation: Rizeq, J., Flora, D. B., & Toplak, M. E. (in preparation). The underlying structure and 
common correlates of three domains of contaminated mindware in adolescents. 
Developmental Psychology. 
 
The study of rational thinking and decision-making has made recent progress with 
developmental samples (e.g., Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014; Chiesi, Primi, & Morsanyi, 2011; 
Levin, Bossard, Gaeth, & Yan, 2014; Toplak et al., 2014a). However, very little has been done to 
understand individual differences in unwarranted beliefs as well as the likely predictors of those 
beliefs among adolescents. Thus, the implications of accumulating contaminated mindware 
remain uninvestigated for adolescents. This scarcity is concerning because mindware is acquired 
across development and contaminated mindware, in particular, is propagated through widespread 
unwarranted beliefs and misinformation in the media and the Internet (Kata, 2010; 
Lewandowsky et al., 2015; Wood & Douglas, 2015).  
Research to date is partly limited by less availability of measurement tools appropriate 
for developmental samples, particularly tools that would allow for direct comparisons across 
developmental periods. Therefore, in Study One we validated the structure of a set of 
developmentally appropriate items measuring individual differences in unwarranted beliefs using 
a young-adult sample. In Study Two, we tested the validity of the underlying structure of these 
items using a sample of adolescents and confirmed the reliability of its scores. In addition, we 
also examined correlates and predictors of the unwarranted beliefs factors to further validate the 
dimensional structure using a sample of adolescents. This investigation uncovered the unique 
effects of cognitive ability, cognitive reflection, AOT, and ontological confusions on the 
unwarranted beliefs factors.  
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Measuring Unwarranted Beliefs in Adolescence 
Unwarranted beliefs have been examined to a lesser extent with children and adolescents 
compared with the literature on young adults and adults. This lack of research is surprising 
considering the strong evidence of comorbidity for these belief domains in young adults and 
adults (e.g., Bruder et al., 2013; Hartman et al., 2017; Lobato et al., 2014). Further, the tools for 
measuring individual differences in unwarranted beliefs among children and adolescents are also 
limited. Several scales have been used to measure aspects of paranormal beliefs in children and 
adolescents, including the Exeter Superstitious Questionnaire (Preece & Bexter, 2000), Magical 
Thinking Questionnaire (Bolton et al., 2002), Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyck, 
1998), Thinking Dispositions Questionnaire (Kokis et al., 2002), Constructive Thinking 
Inventory (Ammerman, Lynch, Donovan, Martin, & Maisto, 2001; Urben, Suter, Piber, Straccia, 
& Stephan, 2014), and the Gambling Beliefs Scale (Ricijas, Dodig, Huic & Kranzelic, 2011). 
These questionnaires either assess one aspect of the paranormal (e.g., only superstitious belief) 
or have not been properly validated for adolescent populations. Studies that have examined 
paranormal beliefs in children and adolescents have done so to the exclusion of other 
unwarranted beliefs, such as conspiracy and anti-science beliefs and attitudes. 
Very few studies have examined conspiracy beliefs among adolescents. Three studies 
have focused on assessing specific conspiracy theories, including conspiracies about birth 
control (Bogart & Thorburn 2006; Thorburn & Bogart, 2005) and specific nationalities 
(Grzesiak-Feldman & Irzycka, 2009). One prominent measure, the conspiracy mentality 
questionnaire (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014), was developed and validated using young-adult and 
adult samples, but has been employed with participants ranging in age from 14 to 80 years old. 
This questionnaire’s psychometric properties have not been assessed with adolescents.  
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Research examining anti-science attitudes and beliefs in adolescence is also scarce. There 
is relatively more work in the field of education on secondary-school students’ attitudes toward 
science, participation in science, and appreciation of practical work in science (e.g., Francis & 
Greer, 1999; 2001; Kind, Jones, & Barmby, 2007). Although these attitudes can be related to 
general anti-science beliefs and attitudes, the measures used mainly focus on capturing students’ 
fondness and affective inclination towards engaging in science. These measures are not suitable 
for comparison with other developmental periods (e.g., young adulthood) when individuals are 
not engaged in similar types of schooling. Further, these measures do not fully reflect the 
construct of interest in this study. Generic anti-science beliefs are captured by one’s perceptions 
of the credibility of the scientific enterprise generally (e.g., Hartman et al., 2017) and one’s 
preference for intuition and instinct over the scientific method (Stanovich et al., 2016). 
Taken together, the measurement tools in the adolescent literature are not well-developed 
to capture individual differences in the three unwarranted beliefs of interest. Therefore, using the 
scale from Study One, we first tested the underlying dimensional structure of individual 
differences in unwarranted beliefs using an adolescent sample. Validating this structure of 
unwarranted beliefs and their respective scores in adolescence allows examination of their 
concurrence and their associations with individual-difference predictors.  
Correlates and Predictors of Unwarranted Beliefs in Adolescents 
Regarding child and adolescent populations, a few empirical studies report a negative 
association between rational thinking and superstitious beliefs. Specifically, in a sample of 
children in Grades 5, 6, and 8, superstitious thinking was negatively correlated with performance 
on a deductive reasoning task, a cognitive ability index, and an AOT scale (Kokis et al., 2002). 
In a sample of children in Grades 2 through 9, superstitious thinking was negatively associated 
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with cognitive ability, higher-order cognitive processes, AOT, and rational thinking measures 
(Toplak et al., 2014). Further, in a sample of adolescents in Grades 8 through 12, superstitious 
beliefs correlated positively with an intuitive style of thinking and negatively with a rational 
style of thinking (Marks, Hine, Blore, & Phillips, 2007). These associations are consistent with 
those reported in the literature on adults. Yet, the associations between rational thinking and 
other unwarranted beliefs, including conspiracy and anti-science beliefs, remain unexamined in 
the adolescent population.  
With the saturation and mass dissemination of information in media outlets and the 
Internet, there has been an associated decline in the quality of information (Poulet, 2011). 
Examining individual differences associated with susceptibility to accumulating unwarranted 
beliefs in adolescence will help us to identify potential domains for intervention at early periods 
of development.  
Study Two 
 We presented the unwarranted belief scale to a sample of high school students to confirm 
the accessibility and appropriateness of the content. In addition, we assessed the reading level of 
the items. Upon confirming accessibility, appropriateness, and reading level of the unwarranted 
belief scale, the three models tested in Study One were also tested in Study Two to confirm the 
latent structure of individual differences in paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs. The 
models were fitted to the final list of items obtained in Study One, which included 20 paranormal 
items, eight conspiracy items, and five anti-science items. As shown in Figure 3, the hierarchical 
model in Study Two has three general factors of paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs 
and four specific paranormal factors (i.e., psi, precognition, spiritualism, and superstition). 
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Figure 3. Generic hierarchical model of unwarranted beliefs tested in the adolescent sample 
 
As in Study One, we expanded the optimally fitting confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
model into a structural regression model to examine the unique effects of cognitive ability, 
cognitive reflection, AOT, and ontological confusions on the latent variables of unwarranted 
beliefs. This examination helps uncover the extent to which the same aspects of thinking and 
reasoning that contribute to the accumulation of contaminated mindware in young adults also 
play a role in adolescence.  
Method 
Participants 
 Data were taken from 324 participants, residents of North America, who were recruited 
through Qualtrics Panels service (Qualtrics, Provo, UT) and received monetary compensation for 
their participation. There were 115 males and 209 females (64.5% female) with ages ranging 
between 12 and 19 years (M = 15.93, SD = 1.25). Eighty-five (26.2%) participants were in Grade 
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9, 75 (23.1%) were in Grade 10, 84 (25.9%) in Grade 11, and 80 (24.7%) were in Grade 12. 
Participants predominantly identified as being white/Caucasian (69.1%), followed by Black or 
African-American (13.3%), Hispanic and/or Latino (8%), Asian (3.1%), Indigenous (0.9%), 
Arab (0.3%) or other (5.2%). In terms of religious affiliation, 69.1% of the participants identified 
as Christian, 6.5% as Agnostic, 1.5% as Muslim, 0.9% as Jewish, 0.6% as Buddhist, and 21.0% 
as other. Most participants (90.7%) reported that their mother finished high school and 84.3% 
reported that their father finished high school. Further, 45.4% reported that their mother finished 
college (i.e., an undergraduate degree) and 37.7% reported that their father finished college.  
Three hundred sixty-eight participants were recruited originally. Data from 44 
participants were discarded because they reported ages outside of the 12- to 19-year range. Data 
were not analyzed prior to removing those participants.  
Measures 
For all items in all measures, participants rated how much they agree with statements 
using a six-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = disagree, 
4 = agree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = strongly agree). 
Contaminated mindware. In order to assess the readability of adapted items and ensure 
their suitability for adolescents, we used the online Coh-Metrix Text Easability Assessor. The 
readability of the statements was assessed at a Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level of 6.9 and items had 
a score of 63.8 for reading ease (Flesch, 1948; 1951). Further, the Gunning Fog index was 8.8, 
indicating that the items are fairly easy to read. Together, these scores indicate that the 
readability of the adapted items is suitable for a high-school sample. Further, no issues regarding 
the accessibility of the content were identified in a pilot sample of high school students.  
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Paranormal beliefs. Paranormal beliefs were measured using the 20 items from the 
revised model in Study One. Of the 20 items, one represented belief in witchcraft (“Witches 
really exist and practice their magical powers in certain parts of the world”), two represented 
belief in Psi (e.g., psychokinesis), five represented superstition (e.g., “some numbers are 
unlucky”), six represented spiritualism (e.g. “it is possible to communicate with the dead”), and 
five items represented precognition (e.g., “astrology is a way to accurately predict the future”). 
One item was based on modern fictional characters (e.g., “Hobbits really exist”). Participants 
were instructed to rate how much they agree with each statement. Higher scores indicate greater 
endorsements of paranormal belief.  
Generic conspiracy beliefs. Conspiracy beliefs were measured using the eight items from 
the revised model in Study One, which were adapted from the generic conspiracy belief scale 
(Brotherton et al., 2013). See Study One for a more detailed description of the individual items. 
Higher scores indicate greater endorsement of conspiracy beliefs.  
 Generic anti-science beliefs and attitudes. Items assessing anti-science beliefs and 
attitudes were adapted from Stanovich et al. (2016). Five items from the final revised model in 
Study One were included in this study (See Study One for a more detailed description of the 
individual items). Higher scores indicate greater endorsement of anti-science beliefs and 
attitudes.  
Actively open-minded thinking. The 12-item Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale 
(Stanovich et al., 2016) was used to assess adolescents’ tendency to consider different 
conclusions, even those that contradict their preferred conclusions and prior beliefs. Participants 
can have a total possible score of 72 with higher scores indicating greater AOT (omega5 = .72).  
 
5 Confirmatory factor analysis was used to estimate one-factor models for all scales in order to obtain reliability 
estimates for the total scores used in the study. The one-factor model fit the data well for all measures except the 
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Cognitive reflection. The expanded 11-item version of the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(CRT; Frederick, 2005) adapted for adolescents (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014b; Toplak et 
al., 2016) was used to measure cognitive reflection. The items assess participants’ ability to 
reflect rather than rely on their intuition. The items are designed to elicit an intuitive incorrect 
response that participants need to override to obtain the correct answer. Each item was scored as 
correct (1) or incorrect (0), with a possible total score of 11. Higher scores are indicative of 
better performance. The reliability of the CRT factor was strong, omega = .90.  
Ontological confusion. The Ontological Confusions Scale (OCS; Lindeman & Aranio, 
2007; Lindeman et al., 2011; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013) described in Study One was used. 
The OCS has been used with samples across a wide range of ages, including adolescents (e.g., 
Napola, 2015; Lindeman, 2011; Svedholm et al., 2010; Lindeman et al., 2015). We used 29 of 
the 30 items in this study because one item (force aims to influence) was confusing for 
adolescents during piloting. Answers were coded as either 1 (correct) or 0 (incorrect) with a 
possible total score of 29. Higher scores indicate better performance (i.e., lower ontological 
confusions). There were also four filler statements (two metaphors and two literal statements) 
that were not used to compute the ontological confusion score. Reliability of a total ontological 
confusions score based on the 29 items used in Study Two was strong (omega = .92), and 
comparable to the estimate presented in Study One (.93). 
Cognitive Ability. The International Cognitive Ability Resource five-item version 
(ICAR-5) was used to assess cognitive ability (Kirkegaard & Bjerrekaer, 2016). The ICAR-5 is a 
short version of the 16-item ICAR (Condon & Revelle, 2014). We used the ICAR-5 because of 
time constraints and to eliminate fatigue effects and inattention.  The ICAR-5 is particularly 
 
AOT scale. A hierarchical AOT model was also tested but its fit remained poor. Therefore, the reliability of the total 
AOT score should be interpreted cautiously as poor model fit might inflate omega estimates. 
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difficult for younger students (6th and 7th grades; Kirkegaard & Bjerrekaer, 2016). Although our 
sample constituted participants in grades 9 through 12, our results show the presence of a floor 
effect in that a large portion of the sample scored near zero. The reliability of the ICAR-5 for 
measuring a cognitive ability factor in our sample was not strong, omega = .52.  
Academic achievement. Participants reported their overall average (out of 100) in four 
academic domains, including Science, Math, English, and Social Studies and History. An 
average of these reports was taken as a composite measure of overall academic achievement. 
Self-reported grade point average scores are often used in research with adolescents (e.g., Fröjd, 
et al., 2008; Quiroga, Janosz, & Bisset, 2013). The reliability of the overall academic composite 
was strong, with omega = 0.90.  
Procedure 
 
 Participants completed the study online using Qualtrics. We contacted registered parents 
in Qualtrics Panels service who have children within the specified age group and who have 
indicated interest in participating in research studies. Parents and youth were presented with 
separate consent forms. Upon parent and youth consent, participants were presented with the 
following screening questions “Are you in high school (i.e., grades 9 through 12)” and “Is 
English your first language?” Only participants who indicated that they were in grades 9 through 
12 were allowed to continue. If a participant noted that English was not their first language, they 
were allowed to continue the study only if they indicated that they have been schooled in English 
for at least eight years.  
Following the consent forms and screening questions, participants were presented with a 
battery of questionnaires and tests in the following order: reflection and intuition questions 
(CRT), a block of paranormal items and AOT items presented in a randomized order, the ICAR-
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5, a block of anti-science items in a randomized order, the OCS, a block of conspiracy items in a 
randomized order, and a demographic questionnaire. The five-item Conscientious Responders 
Scale (CRS; Marjanovic et al., 2014) was intermixed within the unwarranted beliefs items. The 
CRS items instructed participants exactly how to respond and were scored as either correct or 
incorrect. Participants with CRS total scores below 4 out of 5 were deemed random responders 
and their data were not recorded for this study.  
Data Analysis 
 
To address the first goal, CFA was used to test the dimensional structure of individual 
differences in the unwarranted belief domains. Then correlations and SEM were used to assess 
associations among the unwarranted beliefs scores and other individual-difference variables.  
All models were estimated using R software with the lavaan package (version 0.5-17; 
Rosseel, 2012). Maximum likelihood estimation was used with robust standard errors and fit 
statistics (Yuan & Bentler, 2000) to adjust for multivariate non-normality. Model fit was 
evaluated using the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), the root mean square error 
of approximation (RMSEA), the comparative-fit index (CFI), and the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI). 
The same standards for model fit evaluation used in Study One were used in this study.  
Results 
CFA Models of the Structure of Three Domains of Contaminated Mindware 
 The final hierarchical model discussed earlier, with three general factors (i.e., 
paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science) and four specific paranormal factors (i.e., psi, 
precognition, spiritualism, and superstition), fit the data well (CFI = .93, TLI = .93, RMSEA = 
.05, SRMR = .05). The hierarchical model fit the data better than a one-factor model (CFI = .70, 
TLI = .68, RMSEA = .11, SRMR = .10) and a three-factor model (CFI = .88, TLI = .87, RMSEA 
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= .07, SRMR = .06). Table 5 presents the completely standardized general factor loadings and 
the proportion of item-level variance explained by the hierarchical model. The paranormal 
general factor was moderately correlated with the anti-science (r = .54) and conspiracy factors (r 
= .58), and the anti-science and conspiracy factors were also moderately correlated (r = .52).  
Further, the total score reliabilities based on the three general factors were good. Paranormal 
total score had an omega of .93 and the conspiracy and anti-science scores had omegas of .89 
and .81, respectively. The omega scores indicate that the observed total scores based on each 
general factor represent reliable variance (Rodrigues, et al., 2016).  
Table 5. General factor standardized factor loadings and proportion of variance explained in the 
revised hierarchical model in the adolescent sample 
General Factor 
Item 
Standardized 
factor loadings 
Proportion of 
variance 
explained 
Paranormal   
Some people can lift objects using the power from 
their minds 
.71 .72 
A person’s thoughts can influence the movement of a 
physical object 
.70 .72 
Witches really exist and practice their magical powers 
in certain parts of the world 
.68 .46 
If you break a mirror, you will have bad luck .61 .51 
Some numbers are unlucky  .68 .72 
Your mind or soul can leave your body and travel 
(astral projection 
.76 .99 
During altered states, such as sleep or trances, the 
spirit can leave the body 
.74 .59 
It is possible to communicate with the dead .69 .48 
Astrology is a way to accurately predict the future .74 .56 
Horoscopes accurately predict the future .72 .52 
Some psychics can accurately predict the future .67 .52 
Some people have an unexplained ability to predict the 
future 
.71 .69 
You can prevent something bad from happening by 
just touching wood 
.58 .37 
Certain objects, such as rabbit’s feet and four-leafed 
clovers, are known to bring good luck 
.53 .34 
Astrology is a valid explanation for the behaviors and 
personality of people 
.72 .52 
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Dead people can communicate with living people 
through séances or Ouija boards 
.75 .57 
Some numbers and dates are more lucky or unlucky 
than others 
.69 .70 
Certain types of crystals have special powers .75 .56 
Hobbits really exist .50 .25 
Some people have a “sixth sense” that allows them to 
accurately predict the future 
.67 .63 
   
Conspiracy   
The government is secretly involved in the murder of 
innocent citizens 
.73 .53 
The spread of certain diseases is secretly caused by 
certain organizations 
.79 .63 
The government hides information and facts to trick 
the public 
.60 .36 
A secret organization is responsible for making all 
major world decisions, such as going to war 
.78 .61 
The government blames other people to hide its 
criminal activity 
.64 .41 
A small secret group of people control world events .77 .59 
The government routinely tries new drugs on people 
without them knowing 
.78 .60 
Scientists routinely hide important information from 
the public to protect their jobs 
.70 .49 
   
Anti-science   
I tend to rely on my gut feeling even when it 
contradicts a scientific finding 
.70 .50 
Evidence from science is usually biased or wrong .69 .47 
Because scientists disagree with each other, this shows 
that science is about the personal opinions of scientists 
more than actual evidence 
.68 .46 
Your gut feeling is better than relying on science in 
making decisions  
.70 .49 
I don’t rely on findings from science because scientific 
facts can be used to prove anything  
.65 .43 
Note. N = 324. 
 
 Hierarchical model with a general unwarranted beliefs factor. We also estimated a 
hierarchical model with a general unwarranted beliefs factor and three specific factors of 
paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs accounting for residual correlations in the three 
specific domains (in addition to specific factors for psi, precognition, spiritualism, and 
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superstition). This investigation further explores the dimensional nature of individual differences 
in responding to unwarranted belief items in an adolescent sample and allows assessing the 
reliability of an overall unwarranted beliefs total score. The model fit the data well (CFI = .94, 
TLI = .93, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .05). A total score based on the unwarranted beliefs general 
factor had an omega of .86. Similar to the results obtained in Study One, the unwarranted-belief 
total score’s high omega is mainly due to the paranormal items having high standardized general 
factor loadings (ranging from .51 to .76) in contrast to the conspiracy and anti-science items 
having lower standardized general factor loadings (ranging from .28 to .48); therefore, the 
general unwarranted beliefs factor is essentially a paranormal factor (see Eid et al., 2017). Taken 
together, the factor structure of the model with the three correlated general factors of paranormal, 
conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs and attitudes (in addition to the four specific paranormal 
factors) is a better representation of reliable variance in the items.  
Total scale score descriptive statistics  
 
Descriptive statistics are in Table 6 for all total scale scores, including the unwarranted 
beliefs scales based on the factors of the hierarchical CFA model with three general factors. All 
variables were approximately normally distributed with values of skewness and kurtosis near 
zero, except for the academic achievement and CRT variables. In the SEM, the CRT’s raw score 
was used, assuming that the maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors and fit 
statistics adequately adjust for non-normality.  
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of total scale scores in the adolescent sample 
Variable Mean SD Observed 
range 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Predicted correlates      
ICAR-5 1.23 1.20 0, 5 0.83 0.10 
Academic Achievement 
Composite 
82.61 14.86 3.5,100 -2.08 5.88 
CRT 1.42 2.39 0, 11 2.11 3.93 
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AOT  52.49 7.33 36, 71 0.08 -0.61 
OCS  15.83 7.23 0, 29 -0.10 -0.51 
Contaminated mindware       
Paranormal 55.90 20.45 20, 110 -0.08 -0.70 
Conspiracy 27.15 8.63 8, 48 -0.11 0.20 
Anti-science 15.40 4.63 5, 28 -0.30 -0.12 
Note. ICAR-5 = International Cognitive Ability Resource 5-item version; CRT  = Cognitive 
Reflection Test; AOT = Actively Open-Minded Thinking; OCS = Ontological Confusions Scale. 
 
Correlations 
  
Correlations among scale scores are presented in Table 7. First, the paranormal beliefs 
total score was negatively correlated with cognitive ability, academic achievement, CRT, AOT, 
and OCS (rs between -.15 and -.53; all ps < .05).  Similarly, the anti-science beliefs total score 
was negatively correlated with cognitive ability, academic achievement, CRT, AOT, and OCS 
(rs between -.17 and -.49; all ps < .05).  The conspiracy beliefs total score was negatively 
correlated with cognitive ability, OCS, and AOT (rs between -.11 and -.33; all ps < .05). 
However, the conspiracy beliefs total score was not significantly correlated with CRT (r = -.11, p 
= .05) or academic achievement (r = -.10, p = .07). Finally, as hypothesized, the paranormal 
beliefs, conspiracy beliefs, and anti-science beliefs scores were all positively associated (rs from 
.44 to .52) as were cognitive ability, academic achievement, CRT, AOT, and OCS (rs ranging 
from .13 to .52, all ps < .05). 
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Table 7. Correlations among all variables in the adolescent sample and their respective 95% 
confidence intervals 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. ICAR5 1 
 
       
2. Academic 
achievement 
composite 
.16* 
(.05, .26) 
1       
3. CRT .52* 
(.43, .59) 
.15* 
(.04, .25) 
1      
4. AOT .18* 
(.07, .28) 
.31* 
(.21, .41) 
.13* 
(.02, .23) 
1     
5. OCS .36* 
(.26, .45) 
.18* 
(.07, .28) 
.33* 
(.23, .43) 
.34* 
(.24, .43) 
1    
6. Paranormal -.15* 
(-.26, -.04) 
-.21* 
(-.31, -.10) 
-.17* 
(-.28, -.07) 
-.53* 
(-.60, -.45) 
-.42* 
(-.50, -.32) 
1   
7. Conspiracy -.11* 
(-.22, .00) 
-.10 
(-.21, .01) 
-.11 
(-.21, .00) 
-.26* 
(-.36, -.16) 
-.33* 
(-.42, -.23) 
.52* 
(.43,.59) 
1  
8. Anti-science -.19* 
(-.29, -.08) 
-.17* 
(-.27, -.06) 
-.19* 
(-.30, -.09) 
-.49* 
(-.57, -.41) 
-.41* 
(-.50, -.31) 
.47* 
(.38,.55) 
.44* 
(.35,.52) 
1 
Note. * p < .05. ICAR5 International Cognitive Ability Resource 5-item version; CRT Cognitive 
Reflection Test; AOT Actively Open-Minded Thinking; OCS Ontological Confusions Scale. 
 
Structural Equation Model Results 
 
The structural equation model shown in Figure 4 fit the data adequately (CFI = .92, TLI = 
.91, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .05). Table 8 presents the unstandardized path coefficients and their 
respective 95% confidence intervals. The set of individual-difference predictors (cognitive 
ability, CRT, AOT, and OCS) explained 37.6% of the variance in the paranormal beliefs latent 
variable, 17.6% in conspiracy beliefs, and 38.8% in anti-science beliefs and attitudes. AOT and 
OCS significantly predicted paranormal beliefs, conspiracy beliefs, and anti-science attitudes and 
beliefs (all ps < .001). Cognitive ability and cognitive reflection did not significantly predict any 
of the three unwarranted beliefs domains of contaminated mindware. Comparing standardized 
path coefficient estimates (see Figure 4), AOT was the strongest predictor of the latent variables 
for both paranormal beliefs and anti-science beliefs and attitudes, such that higher AOT 
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predicted higher disagreement with those beliefs. Overall, higher ontological confusions and less 
actively open-minded thinking predicted higher endorsements of all three unwarranted beliefs.  
Table 8. SEM unstandardized path coefficients and 95% confidence interval  
Outcome Variable Predictor 
Variable 
Unstandardized Path 
Coefficient 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Paranormal    
 Cognitive ability 0.06 -0.07, 0.19 
 CRT - 0.03 -0.09, 0.03 
 AOT - 0.08 -0.10, -0.06 
 OCS - 0.01 -0.07, -0.03 
Conspiracy    
 Cognitive ability 0.02 -0.09, 0.13 
 CRT -0.00 -0.06, 0.05 
 AOT -0.03 -0.05, -0.02 
 OCS -0.04 -0.06, -0.02 
Anti-Science    
 Cognitive ability 0.01 -0.12, 0.14 
 CRT -0.04 -0.10, 0.03 
 AOT -0.08 -0.11, -0.05 
 OCS -0.05 -0.07, -0.03 
 
 
	 57	
Discussion 
 In Study Two, we supported the utility and psychometric properties of an unwarranted 
beliefs scale in the adolescent population. This endeavor is important for the development of 
research on contaminated mindware in adolescence. We confirmed the fit of the hierarchical 
model to the unwarranted beliefs scale in an adolescent sample. This is the first study with an 
adolescent sample to examine the dimensional structure of individual differences in three 
domains of contaminated mindware. Further, the results demonstrated the unique effects of 
ontological confusions and AOT on all three domains of contaminated mindware, irrespective of 
one’s cognitive ability and cognitive reflection.  
 As outlined before, the tools in the literature that capture paranormal, conspiracy, and 
anti-science beliefs and attitudes are psychometrically underdeveloped in that they are either too 
narrow and specific or are related to but not representative of the broader constructs of interest 
(e.g., Bolton et al., 2002; Francis & Greer 1999;2001; Preece & Bexter, 2000; Bogart & 
Thorburn 2006). In this study, we provide a scale that can be used with adolescents to measure 
individual differences in three unwarranted beliefs that form domains of contaminated mindware. 
Specifically, the hierarchical model fit the data well and the reliability of the scale scores 
representing the three unwarranted beliefs support their utility as valid indices with little 
measurement error as representations of their respective factors. The results from the hierarchical 
model with a general unwarranted beliefs factor did not support a unitary construct of 
unwarranted beliefs among adolescents. These results are consistent with research using young-
adult and adult samples that conceptualizes separable, yet related, domains of unwarranted 
beliefs (e.g., Bruder et al., 2013; Browne et al., 2015; Hartman et al., 2017).  
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 The associations between unwarranted beliefs and their individual-difference predictors 
were in the expected direction, supporting the scale’s criterion validity (see Table 7). Cognitive 
reflection and academic achievement were negatively associated with paranormal and anti-
science beliefs and attitudes, but were not significantly associated with conspiracy beliefs. These 
results are consistent with previous research with adolescents examining paranormal beliefs 
(Kokis et al., 2002; Toplak et al., 2014) and with young-adult and adult samples examining all 
three unwarranted beliefs (e.g., Lindeman et al., 2015; Lobato et al., 2014; Pennycook et al., 
2015a; Stanovich et al., 2016; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013a; Swami et al., 2014). In addition, 
higher levels in all three unwarranted beliefs were associated with higher ontological confusions 
and lower AOT.  
In the structural model, higher AOT and lower ontological confusions uniquely predicted 
lower levels of all three unwarranted beliefs over and above cognitive ability and ontological 
confusions, neither of which significantly predicted the unwarranted beliefs factors. These results 
are the first to examine three unwarranted belief domains and the effects of four associated 
correlates simultaneously in the adolescent population. These results support and extend what we 
found in Study One with young adults.  
Summary of Findings 
In Study One and Two, we tested and replicated the structure of individual differences in 
unwarranted beliefs. The results supported the multidimensional nature of unwarranted beliefs in 
adolescents and young-adults, specifically the presence of three correlated factors for 
paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs and attitudes. Further, similar individual 
difference variables were uniquely associated with the three unwarranted beliefs in both samples. 
The two studies highlight the relevance of an AOT disposition and ontological understanding 
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and knowledge on the accumulation of contaminated mindware as early as young adolescence. In 
the next study, we explore whether the unwarranted belief scale functions equivalently across 
adolescence and early adulthood, which would allow for direct comparisons of scale scores for 
the three unwarranted beliefs domains between these two developmental periods. 
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Chapter 4: The effect of age and development on the accumulation of contaminated 
mindware 
Citation: Rizeq, J., Flora, D. B., & Toplak, M. E. (in preparation). The invariance of three domains 
of contaminated mindware scales across adolescence and young adulthood: A 
developmental comparison. Applied Cognitive Psychology.  
 
With development, one becomes more cognitively sophisticated and adept in acquiring 
advanced scientific information and knowledge. An individual’s stage of cognitive development 
and acquired ability to engage in reflection and deliberation impact the kinds of beliefs one 
accumulates (Kitchener & King, 1981). Individual differences in rational thinking, including 
System 2 processes and thinking dispositions, contribute to the accumulation of beliefs, 
including unwarranted beliefs (Pennycook et al., 2015b; Stahl & van Prooijen, 2018). Therefore, 
it is reasonable to expect that with the development of thinking and reasoning, one’s 
accumulation of unwarranted beliefs and reliance on cognitive biases would be reduced or 
somewhat mitigated. Although unwarranted beliefs have been studied in young adulthood and 
adulthood (e.g. Hartman et al., 2017; Lobato et al., 2014), and to a lesser extent in childhood and 
adolescence (e.g., Kokis et al., 2002; Bogart & Thorburn 2006), research has yet to make a direct 
comparison across developmental periods, which is the purpose of the current study. Such 
research has been scarce in part due to the lack of measurement tools validated for use across 
developmental periods.  
We first describe the average level of endorsement of individual items measuring 
individual differences in unwarranted beliefs across adolescent and young-adult samples for a 
preliminary investigation of the level of endorsement in the these developmental periods. To 
advance the study of unwarranted beliefs across development, we then examined the 
measurement equivalence of the unwarranted belief scale scores across the adolescent and 
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young-adult samples. Scores are determined to be measurement invariant if a person’s observed 
score depends on only their true score and is independent of their group membership (Meredith 
& Millsap, 1992). That is, measurement invariance assesses whether a set of items measures the 
constructs of interest (in our case the three unwarranted beliefs) equivalently across the two 
groups of participants (see Reise, et al., 1993). Investigation of measurement invariance removes 
ambiguity about whether differences in observed scores are attributable to developmental 
differences or represent measurement differences. Demonstrating measurement equivalence 
allows researchers to use the same scales to assess cross-sectional age differences or longitudinal 
changes across adolescence and young adulthood. Upon confirming measurement invariance, we 
compared the total unwarranted beliefs scale scores between samples and examined their 
associations with age in the merged sample. 
Unwarranted Beliefs Across Development 
Pseudoscientific explanations are easier for the human mind to ascertain than scientific 
explanations because the latter often requires competencies beyond common reason and 
inclinations (Bronner, 2016). Those competencies are gained with development as individuals 
become more adept in their understanding of core knowledge systems (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007), 
how knowledge is constructed, and what is true of the world (Kuhn, Cheney, & Wienstock, 
2000). Individuals also become more proficient in utilizing System 2 processes across 
development, demonstrating a higher tendency towards AOT, better ability to recognize bias, 
and superior cognitive reflection and cognitive ability (e.g., Anderson, 2001; Deary, Whalley, 
Lemon, Crawford, & Starr, 2000; Kokis et al., 2002; Toplak et al., 2014). Therefore, we expect 
that endorsement of unwarranted beliefs will decrease with age as one develops cognitively and 
attains higher education (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Dawtry, & 
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Harvey, 2016). With cognitive development and an increased understanding of how knowledge 
is constructed across age, an individual is presumably equipped to distinguish warranted from 
unwarranted information and strong from weak evidence. In turn, individuals should be less 
susceptible to ideas or beliefs that rely on intuition rather than reason. Therefore, what 
individuals know to be true of the world (i.e., epistemic rationality) increases in accuracy across 
development. Nonetheless, the endorsement of unwarranted beliefs can persist independent of 
these developmental factors and in spite of higher education (Browne et al., 2015; Impey, 2013; 
Lindeman, 2018; Walker, Hoekstra & Vogl, 2002). One explanation is that individuals are likely 
to be exposed to more contaminated mindware with time and development because contaminated 
mindware is an acquired domain (Stanovich, 2009). Therefore, increased exposure to content 
related to contaminated mindware with age might mask the effect of cognitive development on 
the accumulation of unwarranted beliefs. 
Age and developmental associations. Research that has specifically examined 
developmental trends of unwarranted beliefs has yielded mixed results. Using child and 
adolescent samples, some work reports age effects with respect to paranormal beliefs, whereby 
boys aged 12 to 13 endorse lower levels of paranormal beliefs than boys aged 7 to 10 (Bolton et 
al., 2002). Further, in samples of grade school students, endorsement of paranormal belief 
decreased across grades (Eder et al., 2011; Preece & Baxter, 2000). Peltzer (2003) found that 
Grade 11 students reported higher scores on superstitious and precognition belief scales 
compared to university students, whereas the latter reported higher scores on psi and spiritualism 
belief scales. In other lines of research, there were no age effects for paranormal beliefs (Chiesi 
et al., 2011; Kokis et al., 2002; Williams et al., 2007), with one study reporting only a weak 
association (r = - .16; Toplak et al., 2014).  
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Research on unwarranted beliefs with young-adult and adult samples has generally 
excluded age associations and developmental comparisons or has only examined age 
associations for secondary purposes such as identifying potential covariates. With respect to 
research examining the rejection of specific scientific claims and attitudes towards credibility of 
science, some studies report nonsignificant age effects (e.g., Browne et al., 2015; Hartman et al., 
2017; Lewandowsky et al., 2013). Further, a meta-analysis on the determinants of belief in 
climate change indicated that age has a relatively small and negligible effect (Hornsey, Harris, 
Bain, & Fielding, 2016). A small positive effect was reported between age and higher belief in 
complementary and alternative medicine (van den Bulck & Custers, 2009). Further, some 
research reports negligible age effects for conspiracy ideation and belief (e.g., Lantian, Muller, & 
Douglas, 2016; Lewandowsky et al., 2013) and paranormal belief (Genovese, 2004; Lantian et 
al., 2016; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006; Rice, 2003; van der Bulck & Custers, 2009). Other 
research reports that conspiracy belief and age are only weakly correlated (r = .10; Imhoff & 
Bruder, 2014). The inconsistency of these results is exemplified by a study on conspiracy beliefs 
in which these beliefs were weakly negatively correlated with age in a first study, but were not 
correlated with age in a second study (Douglas et al., 2015). Further, negative associations 
between paranormal beliefs and age are reported in some research (Douglas et al., 2015), 
whereas other research finds weak positive correlations between age and belief in alien visitation 
and extrasensory perception (Swami et al., 2011) 
Taken together, although seemingly inconclusive, previous research suggests a negligible 
effect of age on unwarranted beliefs because the correlations between age and unwarranted 
beliefs are mixed in direction and often weak. However, most of the studies reviewed have a 
restricted age range, which may mask any true age effects. Research has yet to systematically 
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examine age effects and make direct cross-sectional comparisons across developmentally distinct 
samples using the same set of questionnaires. The current study furthers our understanding of the 
association between cognitive development and resistance and persistence of unwarranted beliefs 
(i.e., paranormal, conspiracy and anti-science beliefs). 
Current study 
The main focus of this study was to examine developmental differences for individual 
differences in the three unwarranted beliefs. This is the first study to have the same scale 
measuring unwarranted beliefs in both adolescent and young-adult participants. Therefore, we 
first described the average level of endorsement of individual unwarranted belief items in both 
samples. We then assessed measurement invariance of the scales measuring individual 
differences in the three unwarranted beliefs across the two samples, before testing cross-sectional 
developmental differences. Investigation of measurement invariance provides evidence for the 
utility of the unwarranted beliefs scales for future research.  
 Measurement invariance across the adolescent and young-adult samples was tested 
separately for each of the three unwarranted beliefs scales. Specifically, measurement invariance 
was tested using (1) a hierarchical model for paranormal beliefs with a general paranormal factor 
and four specific factors (i.e., precognition, psi, superstition, and spiritualism), (2) a one-factor 
model of conspiracy beliefs, and (3) a one-factor model of anti-science beliefs and attitudes. 
Once measurement invariance was established, we examined differences in the total scale scores 
for each domain of unwarranted beliefs across samples before merging the data to estimate the 
correlations between age and scale scores for the three unwarranted beliefs and ontological 
confusions. Table 9 presents the separate measures used in Study One and Two and highlights 
those used in this study (the full list of measures with their items are in Appendix A through J).  
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Table 9. A list of the measures used in Study One and Two 
Young-adult sample (n = 321) Adolescent sample (n = 324) 
Study One Measures 
 
# items Study Two Measures 
 
# items 
Paranormal beliefs 35 Paranormal beliefs 20 
Conspiracy beliefs  12 Conspiracy beliefs 8 
Anti-science  10 Anti-science beliefs 5 
Actively open-minded 
thinking scale  
30 Actively open-minded 
thinking scale  
12 
Cognitive Reflection 
Test 
7 Cognitive Reflection Test 11 
Ontological Confusions 
Scale  
30 Ontological Confusions 
Scale 
29 
Raven’s Advanced 
Progressive Matrices  
18 International Cognitive 
Ability Resource 
5 
Vocabulary Checklist 60 Academic Achievement 4 
Note. Underlined items represent measures used in Study Three.   
 
Method 
Participants 
 Data were taken from the first two studies. In the young-adult sample from Study One, 
there were 58 males and 263 females and their age ranged between 18 and 30 years (M = 19.36, 
SD = 2.09). In the adolescent sample from Study Two, there were 115 males and 209 females 
and their age ranged between 12 and 19 years (M = 15.93, SD = 1.25). When these two samples 
were combined, the merged dataset had an age range from 12 to 30 years (M = 17.63, SD = 2.43) 
and there were 472 females and 173 males.  
Measures 
Paranormal belief. The same 20 items used in Study One and Study Two were used in 
this study to measure individual differences in paranormal belief.  
Conspiracy belief. The same eight items used in Study One and Study Two were used in 
this study to measure individual differences in conspiracy belief. 
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Anti-science belief. The same five items used in Study One and Study Two were used in 
this study to measure individual differences in anti-science belief. 
Ontological confusions. The same 29 items from the Ontological Confusions Scale 
(Lindeman et al., 2011) used in Study Two were used in this study. See Study One and Study 
Two for details about the measure.  
Procedure 
 The data used in this sample were collected as part of Study One and Study Two (see 
previous studies for details on the procedure employed).  
Data Analysis 
 For descriptive purposes, we first examined the mean score for each item within the 
specific unwarranted belief domain across the two developmental groups. We then tested 
measurement invariance between the adolescent and young-adult samples separately for each of 
the unwarranted belief scales, using R software with the lavaan package (version 0.5-17; 
Rosseel, 2012). We conducted a sequential comparison of nested models, with each successive 
model having more stringent equality constraints (Cheung & Rensvold, 1999; Hisrchfeld & Von 
Brachel, 2014; Raju, Laffitte, & Byrne, 2002). First, to establish configural invariance for an 
unwarranted belief scale, we examined the fit of a two-group model in which the basic model 
specification was identical across developmental groups, but all parameters were free to vary 
across developmental groups. Next, to test metric invariance, we compared the fit of the 
configural invariance model with that of a model with all factor loadings constrained to equality 
across developmental groups. Metric invariance establishes that differences in covariance 
between observed variables in the sample are due to the latent variables. Then a scalar invariance 
model, also known as strong invariance model, was tested, where all factor loadings and 
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intercepts are constrained to equality across the two developmental groups. Scalar invariance 
indicates that both covariance and mean differences between observed variables in the sample 
are due to true score differences. Finally, strict invariance was tested by constraining all factor 
loadings, intercepts, and residual variances to be equal across developmental groups. Model fit 
was considered equivalent across models if values of CFI decreased and RMSEA increased by 
.01 or less (Chen, 2007). 
 Independent-samples t-tests were used to test the mean differences in paranormal, 
conspiracy, and anti-science belief total scores and ontological confusions between young adults 
and adolescents. Further, product-moment correlations were used to measure the associations 
among the paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs scores along with ontological 
confusions and age in the merged sample.  
Results 
 
Average Level of Endorsement of Individual Unwarranted Beliefs Items 
 Tables 10 through 12 show the mean score of individual paranormal, conspiracy, and 
anti-science items, respectively, in each sample. Average level of endorsement of paranormal 
beliefs items ranged between 2.13 and 3.40 in the adolescent sample and 2.03 and 3.04 in the 
young-adult sample. Endorsement of conspiracy beliefs items ranged from 3.03 to 3.93 in the 
adolescent sample and between 3.10 and 4.04 in the young-adult sample. Endorsement of anti-
science beliefs items was between 2.69 and 3.42 in the adolescent sample and 2.65 and 3.28 in 
the young-adult sample 
Table 10. Mean score of paranormal items in the adolescent and young-adult sample  
Paranormal Item Adolescent 
sample mean 
score 
Young-adult 
sample mean 
score 
1. Some people can lift objects using 
the power from their minds 
2.43 2.16 
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2. a person’s thoughts can influence 
the movement of a physical object 
2.54 2.19 
3. Witches really exist and practice 
their magical powers in certain 
parts of the world 
2.83 2.40 
4. If you break a mirror, you will 
have bad luck 
2.53 2.39 
5. Some numbers are unlucky 2.79 2.77 
6. Your mind or soul can leave your 
body and travel (astral projection) 
2.94 2.81 
7. During altered states, such as 
sleep or trances, the spirit can 
leave the body 
2.90 2.76 
8. It is possible to communicate with 
the dead 
3.05 2.91 
9. Astrology is a way to accurately 
predict the future 
2.63 2.44 
10. Horoscopes accurately predict the 
future 
2.51 2.36 
11. Some psychics can accurately 
predict the future 
3.11 2.87 
12. Some people have an unexplained 
ability to predict the future 
3.40 3.04 
13. You can prevent something bad 
from happening by just touching 
wood 
2.13 2.35 
14. Certain objects, such as rabbit’s 
feet and four-leafed clovers, are 
known to bring good luck 
3.37 2.83 
15. Astrology is a valid explanation 
for the behaviours and personality 
of people 
2.79 2.59 
16. Dead people can communicate 
with living people through seances 
or Ouija boards 
2.74 2.62 
17. Some numbers and dates are more 
lucky or unlucky than others 
2.94 2.80 
18. Certain types of crystals have 
special powers 
2.79 2.54 
19. Hobbits really exist 2.21 2.03 
20. Some people have a “sixth sense” 
that allows them to accurately 
predict the future 
3.29 2.93 
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Table 11. Mean score of conspiracy items in the adolescent and young-adult sample  
Conspiracy item Adolescent 
sample mean 
score 
Young-adult 
sample mean 
score 
1. The government is secretly 
involved in the murder of innocent 
citizens 
3.26 3.30 
2. The spread of certain diseases is 
secretly caused by certain 
organizations 
3.13 3.10 
3. The government hides information 
and facts to trick the public 
3.93 4.04 
4. A secret organization is responsible 
for making all major world 
decisions, such as going to war 
3.03 3.16 
5. The government blames other 
people to hide its criminal activity 
3.81 3.74 
6. A small secret group of people 
control world events 
3.10 3.12 
7. The government routinely tried 
new drugs on people without them 
knowing 
3.33 3.17 
8. Scientists routinely hide important 
information from the public to 
protect their jobs 
3.57 3.62 
 
Table 12. Mean score of anti-science items in the adolescent and young-adult sample  
Antis-science item Adolescent 
sample mean 
score 
Young-adult 
sample mean 
score 
1. I tend to rely on my gut feeling 
even when it contradicts a 
scientific finding 
3.42 3.28 
2. Evidence from science is usually 
biased or wrong 
2.69 2.65 
3. Because scientists disagree with 
each other, this shows that science 
is about the personal opinions of 
scientists more than actual 
evidence 
2.94 2.87 
4. Your gut feeling is better than 
relying on science in making 
decisions 
3.35 3.10 
5. I don’t rely on findings from 
science because scientific facts 
can be used to prove almost 
anything  
3.00 2.97 
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Measurement Invariance of the Three Unwarranted Beliefs Scales 
Upon testing the hierarchical model of paranormal items across the two developmental 
groups, strict measurement invariance held. Specifically, the configural invariance model had 
CFI = .938 and RMSEA = .069; the metric invariance model had CFI = .932 and RMSEA =.068; 
the scalar invariance model had CFI = .928 and RMSEA = .068; and finally, the strict invariance 
model had CFI = .922 and RMSEA = .069. Therefore, changes in CFI and RMSEA are less than 
or equal to .01 across the models and based on Chen’s (2007) recommendations, these models 
are considered equivalent. Therefore, total scores calculated from the paranormal items measure 
the paranormal beliefs construct equivalently across the developmental groups.  
 Upon testing the one-factor model of conspiracy beliefs, strict measurement invariance 
held. Specifically, the configural invariance model had CFI = .965 and RMSEA = .085; the 
metric invariance model had CFI = .966 and RMSEA =.076; the scalar invariance model had CFI 
= .963 and RMSEA = .074; and finally, the strict invariance model had CFI = .964 and RMSEA 
= .069. Therefore, those models are considered equivalent, implying that total scores based on 
the conspiracy items measure the conspiracy beliefs construct equivalently across the 
developmental groups.   
Upon testing the one-factor model of anti-science beliefs, strong measurement invariance 
held. Specifically, configural invariance model had CFI = .931 and RMSEA = .141; the metric 
invariance model had CFI = .926 and RMSEA =.120; the scalar invariance model had CFI = .924 
and RMSEA = .108; and finally, the strict invariance model had CFI = .905 and RMSEA = .107. 
Therefore, those models are considered equivalent at the strong invariance level. However, the 
residual variances differed across the two developmental groups. Although some research 
suggests that strict invariance is required for group comparisons (Wu, Li, & Zumbo, 2007), 
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Geiser, Burns and Servera (2014) assert that “strict invariance is only necessary when correlated 
errors of measurement exist and are not properly modeled.” Because strong invariance is 
sufficient to determine measurement equivalence and allows for a meaningful comparison of 
group differences in observed means (Geiser et al., 2014; Gregorich, 2006), we are confident that 
we can compare anti-science beliefs scores across the developmental groups. 
Developmental Differences Between Samples in Paranormal, Conspiracy, and Anti-Science 
Beliefs  
 Based on the difference in unwarranted belief scale scores across the two developmental 
samples (see Table 13), the adolescent sample (M = 55.90, SD = 20.45) had a higher paranormal 
beliefs total score than the young-adult sample (M = 51.79, SD =19.08), p = .008. Conspiracy 
beliefs (adolescent: M = 27.15, SD = 8.63; young-adult: M = 27.26, SD = 8.04), anti-science 
beliefs (adolescent: M = 14.77, SD = 3.90; young-adult: M = 14.77, SD = 3.90), and ontological 
confusions (adolescent: M = 15.86, SD = 7.08; young-adult: M = 17.04, SD = 7.37) did not 
significantly differ across the two developmental samples. Further, as shown in Table 14, using 
the merged sample, age (in years) was not meaningfully related to any of the three unwarranted 
beliefs or ontological confusions total scores (r = -.04 to -.14), but ontological confusions score 
was negatively correlated with the three unwarranted belief scale scores (r = -.28 to -.38) such 
that higher confusions are associated with higher endorsement of unwarranted beliefs. Finally, 
the three unwarranted beliefs total scores were all positively correlated with each other (r = .38 
to .44).  
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Table 13. Differences in unwarranted beliefs and ontological confusions between young-adults 
and adolescents  
 Young-adult 
sample (n = 321) 
Adolescent 
sample (n = 324) 
  
Variable Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t Mean difference 
confidence interval 
Paranormal 51.79 (19.08) 55.90 (20.45) 2.64* 0.21, 8.01 
Conspiracy 27.26 (8.04) 27.15 (8.63) -0.16 -1.75, 1.54 
Anti-science 14.77 (3.90) 15.40 (4.63) 1.88 -0.21, 1.48 
OCS 17.04 (7.37) 15.86 (7.08) -2.08 -2.61, 0.24 
Note. * t-statistic significant, p < .0125. Bonferroni correction for 4 comparisons is alpha .012 
and 98.75% confidence interval of the difference. OCS = Ontological Confusions Scale. 
Welch t-test was used because of non-homogenous variance across groups. 
 
Table 14. Correlations among the unwarranted beliefs scales, ontological confusion scale, and 
age in the merged sample and their respective 95% confidence intervals 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Age 1 
 
    
2. Paranormal -.10* 
(-.18, -.02) 
1    
3. Conspiracy -.04 
(-.12, .04) 
.42* 
(.35, .48) 
1   
4. Anti-science -.14* 
(-.21, -.06) 
.44* 
(.38, .50) 
.38* 
(.31, .44) 
1  
5. OCS .05 
(-.03, .13) 
-.37* 
(-.43, -.30) 
-.28* 
(-.35, -.21) 
-.38* 
(-.44, -.31) 
1 
Note. * p < .05. OCS = Ontological Confusions Scale 
 
Discussion 
In this study, we demonstrated measurement equivalence across adolescents and young-
adults for the scales measuring three unwarranted beliefs. By doing so, we were able to 
meaningfully compare observed mean scores across samples. Paranormal beliefs scores were 
significantly greater among adolescents than young-adults, but despite expectations, conspiracy 
and anti-science beliefs scores did not significantly differ between samples. Further, age was not 
significantly correlated with any of the three unwarranted beliefs scores nor the ontological 
confusions score.   
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Endorsement of individual items measuring unwarranted beliefs was consistent with rates 
reported in previous research (Angus Reid Poll, 2016; Brotherton et al., 2013; Gallup & 
Newport, 1990; Lantian et al., 2016). Notably, the most highly endorsed item in each 
unwarranted belief domain was the same in both samples, suggesting that the content of certain 
beliefs is similarly appealing to individuals across development. Specifically, in the paranormal 
domain, about 58.0% of the adolescent sample and 45.8% of the young-adult sample believe that 
some people can predict the future, despite the obvious erroneousness of the idea of 
precognition. In precognition, one ascribes the process of gaining knowledge about possible 
future events to a solely mental process (Lindeman et al., 2015). In the conspiracy domain, 
68.8% of the adolescent sample and 75.0% of the young-adult sample endorsed the belief the 
government hides information and facts, with the intention of deceiving the public. At extreme 
levels, it can be concerning for individuals in a relatively educated and democratic society to 
believe that their government intentionally deceives them. Although such beliefs can sometimes 
be adaptive in challenging social hierarchies and for social change (Sapountzis & Condor, 2010), 
extreme levels of these beliefs can also negatively impact civic engagement and prosocial 
behaviour (e.g., Jolley & Douglas, 2014). Future research should explicate the levels of 
conspiracy belief that can be healthy and motivating from extreme levels that can be debilitating 
and deterministic. In the anti-science domain, around 50.3% of the adolescent sample and 42.5% 
of the young-adult sample endorsed relying on their gut feelings in making decisions, even when 
it contradicts scientific findings. It is alarming that even college-educated students choose not to 
rely on a scientific finding when it contradicts their intuition or gut feeling. This finding suggests 
that whatever effect education may have had in increasing understanding or appreciation of the 
validity of the scientific method, it is insufficient, highlighting the need for more educational 
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effort in teaching the scientific method of investigation. Previous research also indicates that 
unwarranted beliefs persist despite one’s education and scientific literacy (Impey, 2013; Walker 
et al., 2002). Overall, these endorsement rates provide further evidence for the pervasiveness of 
contaminated mindware across age.  
The mean difference in paranormal scores between the two groups was less than 5 points. 
Considering that this score ranges from 20 to 110 in the adolescent sample and 20 to 119 in the 
young-adult sample, this mean difference is not substantial.  In other words, the 5-point mean 
difference translates to 0.83 on a six-point Likert-type scale. Further, unwarranted beliefs were 
not significantly associated with age, with these beliefs being prevalent across age. These results 
lend more support to the notion that higher education and superior cognitive sophistication, both 
of which increase with development, do not decrease the prevalence of unwarranted beliefs. 
Overall, the developmental effects reported in this study are consistent with research reporting 
weak associations between unwarranted beliefs and age (e.g., Browne et al., 2015; Chiesi et al., 
2011; Hartman et al., 2017; Kokis et al., 2002; Lantian et al., 2016; Swami et al., 201; Williams 
et al., 2007).  
The current results and those reported in the literature demonstrate that the level of 
endorsement of unwarranted beliefs is generally stable across development. However, because 
contaminated mindware is acquired with age (Stanovich 2009), it might be difficult to detect the 
effects of cognitive development on the accumulation of contaminated mindware; the two 
domains may have somewhat negating effects on each other. That is, cognitive ability can 
possibly attenuate the rate of contaminated mindware accumulation, but because the latter is an 
acquired domain, one is likely exposed to more contaminated mindware-related content with 
time, which inevitably leads to some accumulation. Further, it is possible that our samples were 
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similar in their average level of cognitive development, considering that cognitive biases (as 
indexed by ontological confusions) did not significantly differ across the two samples. The 
similarity is particularly possible with a young-adult university sample, like ours, which mainly 
consists of participants in the lower end of the age range of young adults. However, our data do 
not address this possibility directly, and future prospective research will be necessary to assess 
the effect of cognitive development on the accumulation of unwarranted beliefs. Further, it is 
possible that the young-adult sample may have not been motivated towards higher epistemic 
rationality, even if they possessed better abilities. Motivation towards epistemic rationality has 
been found to impact the endorsement of unwarranted beliefs and to mediate the effect of 
cognitive reflection on such beliefs (Ståhl & van Proojin, 2018). Finally, it is also possible that 
once unwarranted beliefs are acquired, those beliefs become resistant to falsification by nature, 
making it difficult to debunk or revise these beliefs. Considering the developmental stability of 
unwarranted beliefs, it is valuable to study contaminated mindware as early as adolescence. This 
research should also be applied to education.  
This study’s most novel contribution was the assessment of measurement invariance of 
the unwarranted belief scales across adolescence and young adulthood. Establishing the 
equivalence of these scales provides support for the feasibility of measuring unwarranted beliefs 
in adolescents. Researchers can be confident that any differences in scores between adolescents 
and young adults, on any of the three domains of contaminated mindware, result from true 
differences, rather than measurement artifact. For example, the invariance of the scales suggests  
that adolescents did not systematically interpret the items differently than did young adults. In 
conclusion, researchers can use the unwarranted beliefs scales from this study to further examine 
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belief acquisition across development. In addition, educators can use these scales to assess the 
effect of specific courses or interventions on belief revision and knowledge development.  
Summary of the findings from Study One, Two, and Three 
Taken together, we established the multidimensional nature of individual differences in 
unwarranted beliefs in adolescence as well as young adulthood. The unwarranted beliefs scales 
were also invariant across adolescent and young-adult samples, meaning that these scales can be 
used with samples across both developmental periods, allowing for cross-sectional comparisons 
and prospective research. Further, thinking dispositions and cognitive biases were unique 
correlates of unwarranted beliefs among adolescents and young adults. The persistence of 
unwarranted beliefs across age was also demonstrated.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
 
Overall, the hierarchical model of individual differences in unwarranted beliefs with three 
general factors of paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs had optimal fit in the first two 
studies, showing the multidimensional nature of unwarranted beliefs in adolescents and young 
adults. Further, similar patterns of associations between the three unwarranted belief domains 
and individual difference predictors were present in the adolescent and young-adult samples. 
Specifically, AOT and ontological confusions predicted the endorsement of unwarranted beliefs 
in both samples. In Study Three, unwarranted belief scales were invariant across the two 
samples, allowing for meaningful total score comparisons across these developmental periods. 
Finally, unwarranted beliefs were endorsed to a similar extent in both periods of development, 
although paranormal belief total score was significantly higher in the adolescent sample than the 
young-adult sample.  
Unwarranted beliefs, including paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs, remain 
prevalent in contemporary and educated societies, contributing to contaminated mindware. Such 
mindware can be harmful to individual decision-making (e.g., choosing unsubstantiated medical 
treatments) and the progression of society (e.g., skepticism toward vaccination and climate 
change). This research project was the first to examine the underlying dimensional structure of 
individual differences in three types of unwarranted belief domains. Introducing the study of 
contaminated mindware to adolescence is also imperative from a prevention perspective, so that 
researchers can understand the developmental trajectories of these beliefs and address them at a 
critical age before they become more resistant to change.  
The dimensional structure of three contaminated mindware domains and a monological 
belief system 
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The hierarchical model fit the data well in the adolescent and young-adult samples, which 
implies that reliable scores can be calculated to reflect individual differences in the three 
separate, yet related, domains of unwarranted beliefs in adolescents and young-adults. These 
beliefs share an evaluation-disabling quality that may be integral to their comorbidity (Stanovich, 
2009). The three correlated factors of unwarranted beliefs provide evidence that those domains 
form a network of beliefs characteristic of a self-sustaining worldview through which individuals 
process information and interact with the world, which is known as a monological belief system. 
The role of a monological belief system has been discussed within research on conspiracy 
theories: endorsing one conspiracy theory makes it more likely to endorse others with time (e.g., 
Brotherton et al., 2013; Swami et al., 2011; Van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013; Wood et al. 2012). 
However, this idea has only begun to be discussed with respect to other unwarranted beliefs 
(Lobato et al., 2014). We have yet to develop and study the self-sustaining nature of such a belief 
system with reference to domains of contaminated mindware other than the three unwarranted 
beliefs studied in this dissertation, such as delusional beliefs. 
We are all susceptible to being exposed to misinformation and unwarranted beliefs and 
everyone has likely accumulated some throughout the years. Like anxiety, at certain levels 
unwarranted beliefs can be healthy, normal, and motivating. But at extreme levels, unwarranted 
beliefs can become clinically relevant and debilitating, impacting one’s daily functioning. 
Similarly, our reasoning and progress are partly determined by the degree to which we have 
cultivated a belief system based on unwarranted beliefs. Some of the harms associated with 
endorsing unwarranted beliefs include a decline in informed decisions and scientific literacy, 
financial losses due to unvalidated services, and diversion of resources and mental efforts from 
addressing real or imminent world problems (The National Science Board, 2000). Gleick (2012) 
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adds to this list the proliferation of racist myths associated with memes based on unwarranted 
beliefs; these memes can be persistent despite potential damage to the host (i.e., individual and 
society). Therefore, understanding the factors that contribute to the sustenance and perseverance 
of those beliefs is important.  
Perseverant Beliefs   
Researchers have suggested that beliefs exist in interconnected webs which cohere with 
each other to avoid dissonance or discord (Quine & Ullian, 1970). Our findings support the 
coherence of beliefs, demonstrating that three unwarranted beliefs are co-endorsed by 
participants and share some correlates. Cognitive dissonance theory (CDT) posits that humans 
have a strong preference for consistency (Festinger, 1962), which may help explain the 
coherence of similar beliefs and their perseverance. To maintain such consistency, people tend to 
seek evidence and information that confirms their beliefs over information that critiques these 
beliefs (Connors & Halligan, 2015), suggesting a bias towards confirmatory information 
(Nickerson, 2008). Through this process, individuals preserve prior beliefs and assimilate new 
congruent beliefs, contributing to the perpetuation of self-sustaining and stable belief systems. 
This process can be concerning in the context of unwarranted beliefs. A famous example of 
people’s tendency to confirm their beliefs is the Wason Selection Task, in which participants are 
asked to turn over cards to verify a specific if-then statement (Johnson-Laird, 1970; Wason, 
1968). In that task, participants tend to choose options that confirm the rule rather than options 
that invalidate or disconfirm it.  
People also tend to process ambiguous or unclear information consistently with their 
existing beliefs. For example, people who endorse paranormal beliefs tend to seek patterns and 
overinterpret situations to support the paranormal (e.g., Irwin, 2009). Bronner (2016) further 
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explains that people are more likely to remember lucky situations rather than unlucky ones, 
confirming and reinforcing their superstitious beliefs and rituals. Overall, biased information 
processing affects the tenacity and longevity of unwarranted beliefs and attitudes (Kunda, 1990), 
despite disconfirming evidence (Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Carretta & Moreland, 1982). 
It is also very difficult to use logical arguments and evidence to convince people who endorse 
unwarranted beliefs otherwise (Boudry & Braeckman, 2012). This difficulty is partly the result 
of the aforementioned biases that maintain those beliefs as well as inherent structural features 
that make beliefs immune to systematic investigation (Boudry & Braeckman, 2011).  
Yet, recent research suggests that people tend to revise their beliefs upon presentation of 
congruent and mixed evidence that targets their beliefs (Anglin, 2019). Anglin asserts that people 
are receptive to evidence and willing to change or revise their beliefs, but also discusses the 
possibility of her findings not generalizing to other types of beliefs or to more strongly held 
beliefs. It is important to assess the perseverance of unwarranted beliefs in the face of 
disconfirming evidence empirically. In addition, we can extend this examination to determine 
whether individuals at different developmental periods demonstrate greater openness to belief 
revision than others. 
Belief propagation in the age of information virality. This research aims to inform 
when individuals ought to be critical and reflective of their own beliefs and the information 
accessible to them. The study of unwarranted and self-sustaining belief systems is particularly 
important now that media outlets are saturated with information, requiring consumers to be 
critical in their interpretation and consumption of such information (Halpern, 2014; Tully & 
Vraga, 2017). People are typically expected to believe information presented in trusted media 
outlets and on the Internet and it is certainly onerous for individuals to evaluate the evidence for 
	 81	
all information. In reality, attempting to fact-check all beliefs and information one is presented 
with would be highly debilitating and dysfunctional. Nonetheless, the role of the media and the 
Internet have been widely implicated in the formation of belief generally (Connors & Halligan, 
2015), and unwarranted beliefs specifically (Evans, 1996; Sparks & Pellechia, 1997; Sparks, 
Nelson, & Campbell, 1997), as well as in the content of meme propagation (Gleick, 2012). Some 
have even suggested that the overwhelming liberalization of information on the media and the 
simultaneous disregard of the skill and expertise of the contributors of information will maintain 
a “democracy of the gullible” (Bronner, 2016). Although our data cannot address such a claim, it 
seems timely to study individual differences in unwarranted beliefs and how to best measure 
them across development. In turn, this research project provides a basis for further examining  
the accumulation of contaminated mindware in an age when individuals are overloaded with 
information. We live in an “age of virality, with viral education, viral marketing, viral e-mail and 
video and networking” (Gleick, 2012, p. 316), as well as viral memes. It is unreasonable to 
control the virality of information at a structural or governmental level, because that would verge 
on censorship and authoritarianism, which opposes the virtues of democracy. To acknowledge 
the benefit of information accessibility is important, but to downplay the perils is imprudent. 
Therefore, it is important that educators, students, and responsible citizens learn informed ways 
of consuming information. Importantly, it is people’s responsibility to recognize and 
acknowledge their contribution to the virality of information. This age of virality clearly 
maintains and propagates the beliefs and attitudes that form our culture. Such widespread 
propagation is particularly enriching in terms of exposure to a diverse perspectives and views, 
but also challenging for managing the credibility of various sources and types of information and 
views. 
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Normativity of contaminated mindware 
 So far, we have demonstrated and discussed the prevalence of people’s exposure to and 
endorsement of unwarranted beliefs across adolescence and young adulthood. It is relevant to 
consider the normativity of instances when contemplating or engaging with content relevant to 
unwarranted beliefs may be harmless. For example, engaging one’s imagination in paranormal-
like content such as supernatural powers or extraordinary life forms, some of which can be found 
in fiction, is a normative aspect of development. Specifically, engaging imagination in fiction 
and fantasy is a normal part of young children’s pretend play (Evans & Milanak, 2003). These 
developmental experiences contribute to children’s understanding of social rules without 
confusing or hindering their understanding of the constituents of reality (Rakoczy, 2008), despite 
the paranormal-like content present in the form of supernatural phenomena and extraordinary life 
forms. Exposure to fiction texts in adults also appear to potential benefits, as it is also positively 
associated with social ability (Mar, Oatley, Hirsh, dela Pazm & Peterson, 2006) and narrative 
fiction may transmit social knowledge and facilitate social understanding (Mar & Oatley, 2008). 
For a balanced and accurate understanding of life and truth, some 19th-century philosophers have 
also pursued and encouraged the unification of imagination and thought (Coleridge & Foakes, 
1987; Gorodeisky, 2016). Therefore, it can be harmless and sometimes beneficial to engage in 
imaginative fantasy, contemplating things outside of the realm of reality. 
There are also times when content related to conspiracies turns out to be justified based 
on specific circumstance. That is, some conspiracy theories turn out to be true, and although 
evidence at the time of the theory’s initiation would have been insufficient to support its validity, 
new information can substantiate the theory. It is certainly warranted for citizens to be critical 
and suspicious of existing covert plots or conspiratorial politics, but these suspicions should be 
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differentiated from a more deterministic feature of conspiracy belief and ideation that may 
interfere with one’s judgement. In the latter, an individual only sees conspiracies across 
situations and time and is not open to alternatives. It is reasonable for individuals to show 
healthy inquisitiveness where one challenges the status quo or a scientific finding. People also 
regularly question a government decision or policy put forward due to possible negative 
repercussions or harm to society and in specific circumstances, conspiracy theories may motivate 
one to challenge social hierarchies (Sapountzis & Condor, 2010). Historical and societal 
oppression and discrimination can also lead to the perpetuation of conspiracy beliefs, which may 
justify individuals’ current mistrust of authority. However, in certain cases conspiracy belief or 
ideation can harm the individual, leading to increased risky health behaviours (e.g., 
contraception-related conspiracies; Bogart & Thorburn, 2006; Thorburn & Bogart, 2005).  
Such circumstances present some examples of when specific beliefs or information 
warrant contemplation, despite a lack of available evidence. Nonetheless, it is important to 
separate beliefs that lack necessary support when trying to reason about the real world, 
particularly when interacting with multiple sources of information. Especially important is 
recognizing that multiple sources of information can be correct, that people can have multiple 
interpretations of the same situation, and that some views or perspectives might have more 
epistemic merit or scientific evidence than others (Hallett et al., 2002; Muis et al., 2006). There 
are also reasons to evaluate whether certain ideas are suspicious and harmful if adopted. 
Individuals should be suspicious of mindware that resists evaluation and falsification (Stanovich, 
2009). Stanovich warns against mindware that is self-reinforcing and has costs that are too 
excessive to allow for its examination (e.g., life threatening) and mindware that by default 
restricts a person’s options for future goal pursuit or plans (e.g. joining a cult). Further research 
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is required to explicate the situations where it is normal and unharmful to engage beliefs that lack 
sufficient evidence, particularly in relation to the function of these beliefs.  
Measurement of individual differences in unwarranted beliefs 
 We have made several advances in the measurement of paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-
science beliefs and attitudes in adolescence and young adulthood. Like most constructs in 
psychology, unwarranted beliefs are not directly observable. Therefore, we utilized questionnaire 
items that were designed to measure individual differences in the three unwarranted belief 
domains. Observed scores based on such questionnaires typically have a degree of measurement 
error and, when relied upon, can lead to biased approximations of the associations among the 
constructs of interest (Westfall & Yarkoni, 2016). To more accurately assess these three 
unwarranted belief domains, we first used confirmatory factor analysis to test the underlying 
structure of the beliefs driving individual differences in the endorsement of the items in our 
questionnaires. These measurement models are optimal because they represent the associations 
between constructs free of measurement error and the respective questionnaire items designed to 
measure them (Flora, 2017). In turn, these models show how well the items represent or assess 
the constructs of interest. Further, we assessed the reliability of the scale scores implied by these 
factors, which reflects the extent to which score variance is due to the construct of interest 
(McDonald, 1999). It is fundamental to the progress of psychological science to examine the 
internal structure of questionnaires and the reliability of their scores in order to ensure accurate 
conclusions (Flake, Pek, & Hehman, 2017). The associations reported in the literature among 
unwarranted beliefs have not accounted for measurement error, but been limited to identifying 
bivariate associations among observed variables. Further, the scales measuring aspects of 
contaminated mindware in the literature have also been designed separately in young adulthood 
	 85	
and adolescence. Research has not assessed whether the measures yield scores that validly 
represent individual differences in the constructs of interest similarly in those two periods of 
development.  
The results from this dissertation allow several conclusions regarding the measurement of 
individual differences in unwarranted beliefs: 1) Paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs 
and attitudes are separable constructs that should be measured using separate scales; 2) 
constructs of paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs are positively associated; 3) the 
paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs and attitudes scores represent reliable variance 
in their respective domains in both adolescents and young-adults; and 4) scores on the 
paranormal, conspiracy, and anti-science beliefs and attitudes scales measure these beliefs 
equivalently across adolescence and young adulthood. Taken together, this research confirms 
that individual differences in these domains are measurable in adolescence and young adulthood.  
We also examined individual differences in thinking and reasoning to complement the 
measurement of unwarranted beliefs and to identify factors associated with a susceptibility to 
endorsing these beliefs. Specifically, we examined the association with cognitive ability, 
cognitive reflection, AOT, and ontological confusions in adolescence and young adulthood. We 
also conducted a cross-sectional comparison of belief endorsement across adolescents and young 
adults.  
Common correlates of contaminated mindware in young adulthood and adolescence  
As can be seen in Studies One and Two, there were similar patterns of associations in 
adolescents and young adults between unwarranted beliefs and indices of cognitive ability, 
cognitive reflection, academic achievement, AOT, and ontological confusions. The associations 
among unwarranted belief domains were stronger in the adolescent sample (inter-factor 
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correlations ranged between .52 and .59) than in the young-adult sample (inter-factor correlations 
ranged from .34 to .43). In the adolescent sample, ontological confusions and AOT had 
associations with the three unwarranted beliefs, above and beyond cognitive ability and cognitive 
reflection. In the young-adult sample, similar patterns were present, although AOT did not have 
a significant unique association with conspiracy beliefs. Further, the standardized regression 
coefficients between ontological confusions and all three unwarranted belief domains were 
stronger in the adolescent sample than in the young-adult sample. It is possible that these 
variables have a greater impact on unwarranted beliefs earlier in development, at which point the 
beliefs’ structure is in part self-sustaining, ensuring its persistence.  
 In the structural equation models, residual associations among the three unwarranted 
beliefs were statistically significant in both samples, and again to a greater extent in the 
adolescent sample than in the young-adult sample. Further, age was not correlated with 
individual differences in unwarranted beliefs in the merged sample, in which participants had an 
age range of 12 to 30 years. Level of education (i.e., secondary school students versus 
undergraduate university students) and development (i.e., adolescents versus young adults) also 
were not statistically significantly associated with individual differences in conspiracy and anti-
science beliefs and attitudes, and only weakly associated with paranormal beliefs. These results 
are consistent with studies in which education and development have little effect on belief 
vitality (e.g., Bronner, 2016; Walker et al., 2002) and further speak to the longevity and 
perseverance of beliefs (Kunda, 1990). However, knowledge and epistemic rationality can still 
improve with age and education despite the perseverance of unwarranted beliefs. Notably, 
unwarranted beliefs and epistemically warranted beliefs, as well as knowledge, are not mutually 
exclusive and can be accumulated in conjunction (Shtulman & Harrington, 2015). Importantly, 
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we identified two unique correlates of unwarranted beliefs across two periods of development, 
namely ontological confusions and AOT. 
Ontological confusions, actively open-minded thinking, and individual differences in 
contaminated mindware. We found that individuals with a disposition to think and process 
information that confirms their beliefs, overlooking alternative conclusions, are more likely to 
endorse paranormal and anti-science beliefs in young adulthood as well as conspiracy beliefs in 
adolescence. Furthermore, some unwarranted beliefs might represent an ontologically-confused 
understanding of the world, including paranormal beliefs (Lindeman, Cederstrom, Simola, 
Simula, Ollikainen, & Riekki, 2008), conspiracy beliefs (Brotherton and French, 2015; Lobato et 
al., 2014), and belief in alternative and complementary medicine (Lindeman, 2011; Lindeman & 
Saher, 2007; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013b). Here we support such a conclusion and extend it to 
include generic anti-science beliefs and attitudes. Ontological confusions represent category 
mistakes when ascribing properties of the mental, physical, and biological worlds, as well as 
when differentiating the intentionality of the animate from inanimate and the properties of the 
living and lifeless (Lindeman et al., 2015). Specifically, anti-science beliefs represent a 
preference for intuition and gut feelings over scientific method, where one might attribute human 
motivation or intentionality to inanimate beings, such as physical or biological processes. These 
ontological domains should be clearly distinguished when reasoning about the real world and 
when one is required to evaluate what may be true of the world.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that one should invest in thinking dispositions that 
promote critical thinking, belief revision, and ontological understanding to reduce the 
propagation of contaminated mindware. Educators can help individuals become more vigilant to 
ontological mistakes in information when teaching about the scientific method and the 
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importance of evaluating evidence when learning new information. Adding specific instruction 
in educational curricula at younger ages should help students develop the skills needed to 
differentiate aspects of reality and avoid ontological mistakes and biases (Douglas et al., 2016; 
Lobato et al., 2014). Instruction should also help instil a thinking disposition that allows for 
beliefs to be revised as well as a desire to seek and hold true beliefs about the world (Stanovich, 
2009).  
It is important to note, however, that even teachers demonstrate endorsement of the same 
unwarranted beliefs that our research proposes to mitigate (e.g., Mikuskova, 2018; Yates & 
Chandler, 2000). Teachers also partly disseminate aspects of unwarranted belief (Eve & Dunn, 
1990). Therefore, direct instruction regarding ontology and intuitive ontological mistakes should 
begin with teachers in training, considering that teachers are one of the most influential sources 
of information for children and adolescents. If teachers partly serve as sources of unwarranted 
belief, it can explain why schooling and development have little effect on students’ endorsement 
of unwarranted beliefs. Nonetheless, there is clearly more to the endorsement of unwarranted 
beliefs than the role of educators or teachers, especially considering the aforementioned 
correlates as well as the nature of belief formation and persistence. Therefore, these factors 
should all be considered in conjunction for a better understanding of the propagation of 
unwarranted beliefs across development. 
Limitations and future directions 
Despite the strengths and important contributions of the current research project, there are 
some limitations and future research directions to be considered. 
Sample characteristics and diversity of education level. This research was limited to a 
young-adult university sample, which might not generalize to the general young-adult population 
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with a variety of education levels. Although our young-adult university sample had an age range 
of 18 to 30, most of the participants were between 18 and 22, potentially not capturing all the 
characteristics of the young-adult population. For instance, obtaining a sample of individuals 
with a graduate-level education might yield less endorsement of unwarranted belief. One study 
demonstrated that a higher level of education, such as that of professors, is associated with 
higher skepticism and lower endorsement of paranormal beliefs compared to students, with 
students showing greater skepticism than the general population (Genovese, 2005). Nonetheless, 
there is more research suggesting that the level of endorsement of unwarranted beliefs does not 
change between secondary school and university (e.g., Kokis et al., 2002; Lindeman, 2018; 
Impey 2013; Walker et al., 2002). In addition, it will be informative to include samples with 
distinct characteristics, such as educational field of study.  
Online data collection and level of engagement. Participants in our research completed 
both studies online. Ample research in the social, behavioural, and health sciences uses web-
based surveys and online research platforms for participant recruitment, including children, 
adolescents, young adults and adults (e.g., Blumenberg & Barros, 2016; McCabe, Boyd, Young, 
& Crawford, 2004). Research has found that online data collection methods yield similar results 
as paper and pencil administration (Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013; Weigold, Weigold, & 
Russell, 2013). In addition, based on national and sample-level research, adolescents in North 
America between the ages of 12 and 17 are frequent and adept users of technology and the 
computer (Greenhow, Walker, & Kim, 2009; Lenhart, 2012; Li, Snow, & White, 2015). 
Therefore, we did not anticipate any problems with adolescents navigating the online study and 
working on a computer or tablet. Taken together, along with our validity checks throughout the 
studies, we are confident that online methods are valid for data collection. Specifically, online 
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data collection allows researchers to access participants in remote areas as well as obtain larger 
and more diverse samples than other methods.  
However, online data collection might have negatively affected participants’ engagement 
in the study, particularly for the performance-based measures employed. Based on the low scores 
for our performance-based measures and likely floor effects for these scores in the adolescent 
sample, it seems that some of our measures were too difficult for some participants. Specifically, 
although the ICAR-5 was used with secondary school students, it has shown floor effects with 
the younger grades (Kirkegaard & Bjerrekaer, 2016). We used the ICAR-5 because of its 
concision and public accessibility, which made it suitable for our time constraints and online data 
collection. However, in future research with adolescents, one might reconsider alternatives to the 
ICAR-5. Participants may also have been unmotivated in these online studies without researcher 
supervision, and this should be considered when designing future studies.  
Additionally, the questionnaire presentation was fixed for both samples, alternating 
between performance-based measures and rating scales. We recognize that random presentation 
might have been a more ideal study design. Future projects should consider counterbalancing the 
presentation or using completely randomized presentation.   
Measurement modality. It is notable that the AOT, OCS, and unwarranted beliefs scales 
shared measurement modality (i.e., rating scales), whereas cognitive reflection and the cognitive 
ability measures were performance-based. In particular, if there were floor effects on 
performance-based measures, then there was reduced variability in scores on those measures, 
possibly impacting their associations with rating scales. Further, the shared measurement 
modality might have inflated associations among the AOT, OCS, and the unwarranted beliefs 
scales. Where possible, future research can benefit from incorporating behavioural and 
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performance-based measures when assessing unwarranted beliefs. For example, some research 
uses laboratory simulations where the effect of introducing a superstitious ritual on reasoning 
and decision-making is assessed (e.g., Furlan, Agnoli, & Reyna, 2013). Finally, we discussed our 
results in the context of a monological belief system but did not directly measure it. Future work 
should directly assess individual differences in possessing a monological belief system and its 
effects. 
Future directions. This research focused on individual differences in several domains of 
rational thinking, including System 2 processes and dispositions. It will be valuable for future 
studies to include other variables that may contribute to the endorsement of unwarranted beliefs. 
Variables such as need for control, tolerance for uncertainty, Big Five personality traits, and 
jumping to conclusions, which have all been associated with unwarranted beliefs (e.g., Hogg, 
Adelman, & Blagg, 2010; Moulding et al., 2016; Pennycook et al., 2015; Swami et al., 2011; 
Van Prooijen & Acker, 2015). Isolating the effects of such variables from those examined herein 
can provide a more fulsome understanding of the factors contributing to individual differences in 
unwarranted beliefs. It will also isolate situational factors (e.g., uncertainty) from individual 
differences and allow us to assess the interaction between them. Further, it may be worthwhile to 
develop generic paranormal items that are context-independent, representing general paranormal 
ideation, similar to the items used to measure generic conspiracy and anti-science beliefs and 
attitudes.  
Aspects of unwarranted beliefs, particularly conspiracy and paranormal beliefs, have 
been associated with pathological beliefs, such as paranoid, schizotypal, and delusional beliefs 
and ideation (e.g., Barron, Furnham, Weis, Morgam, Towell, & Swami, 2018; Cella, Vellante, & 
Preti, 2012; Darwin et al., 2011; Hergovich, Schott, & Arendasy, 2008; van der Tempel & 
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Alcock, 2015). Delusional ideation has also been hypothesized to result from an individual’s 
intolerance of uncertainty in the face of paranormal-like experiences or beliefs (Houran & Lang, 
2004). Further, individuals with greater delusional ideation show greater endorsement of 
conspiracy beliefs, which is partly explained by a reduced tendency to possess an analytic or 
reflective disposition (Barron et al., 2018). Unwarranted beliefs are not conceptualized as 
indicators of psychopathology or pathological belief. Nonetheless, they share similar cognitive 
and information processing biases (e.g., Cella et al., 2018; Houran and Lange, 2004; Irwin, 
Dagnall, & Drinkwater, 2012; Lawrence & Peters, 2004). Unwarranted beliefs show positive 
associations with pathological belief and schizotypy, which is a prodromal stage to schizophrenia 
(Hergovich, Schott, & Arendsay, 2008). Extending the study of unwarranted beliefs to samples 
with schizophrenia is particularly relevant because individuals with schizophrenia present with 
paranoid and delusional beliefs and are often mistrustful (Warman & Beck, 2003). In the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Fifth Edition (DSM–5), schizotypy or 
schizotypal personality disorder includes paranormal, suspicious, and paranoid ideation in its 
defining criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Therefore, it would be informative 
for an enhanced clinical conceptualization of pathological beliefs to further study the association 
between unwarranted beliefs and psychopathology. In addition, extending the study of the impact 
of unwarranted beliefs on the maintenance or formation of pathological belief could aid in earlier 
identification and intervention. In particular, the assessment of unwarranted beliefs such as 
paranormal and conspiracy beliefs, which share features with schizotypy, might serve to identify 
normative levels from clinically relevant levels indicating proneness to schizophrenia. It is 
noteworthy that schizotypy emerges in childhood and adolescence and schizophrenia typically 
emerges in late adolescence and young adulthood (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The 
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age of onset of these clinical disorders highlights the relevance of measuring unwarranted beliefs 
early in development rather than later.   
Finally, although this was the first cross-sectional investigation of differences in 
unwarranted beliefs, longitudinal or prospective designs will enable us to assess the trajectory of 
unwarranted beliefs. With the strong psychometric properties of the scales developed in this 
research, future work can use these scales in prospective designs to provide a more 
comprehensive representation of developmental change for unwarranted beliefs. Further, 
prospective designs can also more accurately uncover the mechanisms of change in endorsement 
of unwarranted beliefs across development.  
Conclusion 
Overall, the nature of belief remains understudied compared to other cognitive processes, 
partly because of its structural complexity and the multitude of factors that impact it as well as a 
lack of consensus on what constitutes a belief (Connor & Halligan, 2015). This was the first to 
study the dimensional structure of individual differences in three unwarranted belief domains, 
supporting a hierarchical model in both adolescent and young-adult samples. Ontological 
confusions and AOT were uniquely associated with the endorsement of unwarranted beliefs, 
holding constant one’s level of cognitive ability and cognitive reflection capacity. The 
consistency of unwarranted beliefs across the two samples speaks to the early and resistant 
nature of those beliefs and the need for research and educational intervention at earlier periods of 
development. These findings inform psychological research on the nature of belief and 
individual differences in rational thinking, which can also inform educational research. The 
current results point to further examination of the consequences of unwarranted beliefs on 
society and should be considered in the development of science curricula that can help students 
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identify and assess ontological confusions. In this research, we focused on developing and 
utilizing appropriate measurement scales for assessing unwarranted beliefs as well as examining 
individual-difference predictors of these beliefs. We employed a cognitive-developmental 
approach to studying three domains of contaminated mindware along with their correlates and 
predictors. This research program can be developed further to incorporate interactive factors at 
the interpersonal, social, and environmental levels as well as extend it to the study of 
pathological belief formation. With the tools we offer in this research project, it can be possible 
to pursue those research avenues across developmental periods.   
  In conclusion, this research has implications for science, literacy, reasoning, and rational 
thinking. We hope to have instilled and highlighted the importance of upholding a critical 
perspective, flexible learning and unlearning, and warranted and substantiated beliefs in an age 
of information virality. We would be remiss, however, to end the discussion without 
acknowledging that a little bit of magic never hurts.  
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Appendix A. Contaminated Mindware Questionnaire Items used in Study One and Two 
Rating scale 
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = disagree, 4 = agree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = 
strongly agree 
 
Scoring 
Higher scores indicate higher endorsements of contaminated mindware beliefs 
(R) indicates items need to be reverse scored 
 
Paranormal 
 
Psi 
1. Some people can lift objects using the power from their minds 
2. The movements of objects through mental powers is impossible (R) 
3. A person’s thoughts can influence the movement of a physical object 
4. Mind reading is not possible (R) 
Witchcraft 
5. Black magic can be used for evil and selfish purposes 
6. Witches really exist and practice their magical powers in certain parts of the world 
7. Actual cases of witchcraft have been documented in some parts of the world 
8. It is impossible to cast spells on persons using magic charms or hexes (R) 
Superstition 
9. Black cats can bring bad luck 
10. If you break a mirror, you will have bad luck 
11. Some numbers are unlucky  
12. Bad things happen when you step on a crack on the pavement 
13. Bringing lucky mascots or lucky charms are effective at sporting events 
14. You can prevent something bad from happening by just touching wood 
15. Certain objects, such as rabbit’s feet and four-leafed clovers, are known to bring good 
luck 
16. Some numbers and dates are more lucky or unlucky than others 
Spiritualism 
17. Your mind or soul can leave your body and travel (astral projection) 
18. During altered states, such as sleep or trances, the spirit can leave the body 
19. Reincarnation does occur 
20. It is possible to communicate with the dead 
21. Dead people can communicate with living people through séances or Oijua boards 
22. Certain types of crystals have special powers 
23. Astrology is a valid explanation for the behaviors and personality of people 
24. A full moon causes people to behave oddly 
Precognition 
25. Astrology is a way to accurately predict the future 
26. Horoscopes accurately predict the future 
27. Some psychics can accurately predict the future 
28. Some people have an unexplained ability to predict the future 
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29. Some people have a “sixth sense” that allows them to accurately predict the future 
Contemporary fiction  
30. Zombies can really be found in graveyards after midnight. 
31. Werewolves are real living people during the daytime. 
32. Mermaids really live in the ocean, near the South Pacific.  
33. There are historical documents showing that fire breathing dragons really existed. 
34. Hobbits really exist. 
Other paranormal beliefs  
35. Extraterrestrial life forms have visited Earth and abducted human beings 
 
Conspiracy 
 
1. The government is secretly involved in the murder of innocent citizens. 
2. Secret organizations communicate with aliens from space 
3. The spread of certain diseases is secretly caused by certain organizations 
4. The government hides information and facts to trick the public 
5. A secret organization is responsible for making all major world decisions, such as going to 
war 
6. Evidence of alien contact is being hidden from the public 
7. Technology can be used for mind control 
8. The government blames other people to hide its criminal activity 
9. A small secret group of people control world events 
10. The government routinely tries new drugs on people without them knowing 
11. Scientists routinely hide important information from the public to protect their jobs 
12. Most sports competitions are rigged, that is, winners are chosen before the competition 
 
Anti-science  
 
1. When science and common sense disagree, science is usually correct (R) 
2. I tend to rely on my gut feeling even when it contradicts a scientific finding 
3. Science helps us figure out what is true about the world (R) 
4. When my mind and gut disagree, I tend to go with my gut when making decisions  
5. Evidence from science is usually biased or wrong 
6. Scientific understanding gets better over the years (R) 
7. Because scientists disagree with each other, this shows that science is about the personal 
opinions of scientists more than actual evidence 
8. Your gut feeling is always the best guide in making decisions 
9. I don't rely on “scientific facts”, because scientific facts can be used to prove almost 
anything 
10. The scientific method of measuring observable events in the world has led to important 
knowledge (R) 
 
 
 
 
	 123	
Appendix B. Ontological Confusions Scale used in Study One and Two 
 
Rating scale 
literally true = 1, not literally true = 0 
 
Natural, lifeless objects are living 
1. Stars live in the sky 
2. Stones live in the forest 
3. A rock lives long 
4. Water lives in nature 
5. The moon lives at night 
Force is living and animate 
6. Force lives in the universe 
7. Force senses a human 
8. Force wants to move 
9. Force aims to influence 
10. Force knows its direction 
Lifeless objects are animate 
11. The sun can see a long way 
12. The moon aims to move forward 
13. Stones sense the cold 
14. Planets know things 
15. Earth wants water 
Living inanimate entities are animate 
16. Trees aim to move upwards 
17. Trees sense the wind 
18. Flowers want light 
19. Flowers feel the cold in autumn 
20. Plants know the seasons 
Artificial objects are animate 
21. A home knows its residents 
22. A home misses people 
23. Furniture wants a home 
24. A house senses its environment 
25. A house knows its history 
Mental states are material objects 
26. Grief moves in the stomach 
27. A mind touches another 
28. A thought grows by concentrating 
29. A mind breaks when it is ill 
30. A plan lives in nature 
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Appendix C. Actively Open-minded Thinking Scale used in Study One 
Rating scale 
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = disagree, 4 = agree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = 
strongly agree 
 
Scoring 
Higher scores indicate higher endorsements of contaminated mindware beliefs 
(R) indicates items need to be reverse scored 
 
1. Changing your mind is a sign of weakness. (R) 
2. What beliefs you hold have more to do with your own personal character than the 
experiences that may have given rise to them. (R) 
3. If a belief suits me then I am comfortable, it really doesn’t matter if the belief is true. (R) 
4. A person should always consider new possibilities.   
5. It is a noble thing when someone holds the same beliefs as their parents. (R)  
6. My beliefs would not have been very different if I had been raised by a different set of 
parents. (R)  
7. One should disregard evidence that conflicts with your established beliefs. (R)  
8. If I think longer about a problem I will be more likely to solve it.  
9. Someone who attacks my beliefs is not insulting me personally.  
10. Basically, I know everything I need to know about the important things in life. (R)  
11. Even if my environment (family, neighborhood, schools) had been different, I probably 
would have the same religious views. (R)  
12. Considering too many different opinions often leads to bad decisions. (R)   
13. It is important to persevere in your beliefs even when evidence is brought to bear against 
them. (R)  
14. People should always take into consideration evidence that goes against their beliefs.  
15. Difficulties can usually be overcome by thinking about the problem, rather than through 
waiting for good fortune.  
16. Certain beliefs are just too important to abandon no matter how good a case can be made 
against them. (R) 
17. I think I would vote more intelligently if I had more knowledge of social and political issues.  
18. There is nothing wrong with being undecided about many issues.  
19. Abandoning a previous belief is a sign of strong character. 
20. When reading a book on history I like knowing that I am reading something that actually 
happened.  
21. Coming to decisions quickly is a sign of wisdom. (R)  
22. Beliefs should always be revised in response to new information or evidence.  
23. People who hold contradictory ideas without being bothered at all by it really frustrate me.  
24. It makes me happy and proud when someone famous holds the same beliefs that I do. (R)  
25. It doesn’t really matter if I get some facts wrong because the facts are always changing 
anyway.  (R)   
26. I like to gather many different types of evidence before I decide what to do.  
27. I don't feel I have to have reasons for what I do.  (R) 
28. I like to think that my actions are motivated by sound reasons.  
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29. I like to have reasons for what I do.  
30. I don't like to have to justify my actions. (R)  
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Appendix D. Cognitive Reflection Test used in Study One 
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost? ____ cents 
correct answer = 5 cents, intuitive answer = 10 cents 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 min to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to 
make 100 widgets? ____ min 
Correct answer = 5 minutes, intuitive answer = 100 minutes 
3.  In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover 
half of the lake? ____ days 
Correct answer = 47 days, intuitive answer = 24 days 
4. If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of water in 
12 days, how long would it take them to drink one barrel of water together? (In days) 
Correct answer = 4 days, intuitive answer = 3 days 
5. Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many 
students are in the class? (In students) 
Correct answer = 29 students, intuitive answer = 30 students 
6.  A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and sells it finally for 
$90. How much has he made? (In dollars) 
Correct answer = 20, intuitive answer = 30 or 10 
7. Simon decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market one day early in 2008. Six months 
after he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had purchased were down 50%. Fortunately 
for Simon, from July 17 to October 17, the stocks he had purchased went up 75%. At this 
point, Simon has: a) broken even in the stock market, b) is ahead of where he began, c) 
has lost money 
Correct answer = c, intuitive answer = b 
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Appendix E. Raven’s Progressive Matrices Nonverbal Reasoning Measure Used in Study One 
Instructions 
Below is an example of a spatial matrix problem. In the top box is a pattern with a piece missing. 
Your task is to choose from the eight alternative pieces below the box and identify the correct 
one that completes the pattern at the top. 
 
Take a look at this example and see how it can be solved. First, you can see that each of the top 
two rows contains one circle, one square, and one diamond shape. Since the last row already 
contains a square and a circle, the missing piece must have a diamond shape. Thus, the answer 
must be either #2, #5, or #8. Looking further, you can see that the pieces in the top row have one 
line going through them, the pieces in the middle row have two lines going through them, and 
the pieces in the bottom row have three lines gong through them. Therefore, since you have 
eliminated all alternatives except #2, #5, and #8, the answer must be #5. You can check this by 
noting that in each row the lines are vertical in one piece, slanted to the left in one piece, and 
slanted to the right in another. You can confirm that #5 is the correct example by noting that its 
lines are slanted in the correct direction. 
 
Study the example below. Ask the experimenter for help if you do not understand why #5 is the 
correct answer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The experimenter will give you the rest of the matrix problems. Please raise your hand to let the 
experimenter know that you are ready for this part of the study. There are 18 problems in all. The 
problems will get harder and harder as you go along, but the task is always the same, to pick the 
piece that you think best fits the pattern. No one should expect to solve all the problems, because 
some of them are very difficult and you will be working under a time limit. Just try to do as well 
as you can. You will have fifteen minutes to complete the 18 problems, so do not spend all of 
your time on one that you cannot answer. If you run out of time, please do NOT simply guess at 
problems you have not yet looked at. Write your responses to the problems in the spaces 
provided below.  
 
Answer Key: 
Practice. 5 1. 6	2. 1	3. 2	
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4. 4	5. 6	6. 7	7. 3	8. 8	9. 8	10. 7	11. 6	12. 3	13. 7	14. 2	15. 7	16. 5	17. 6	18. 5	
Problem #1 
 
 
Problem #2 
 
 
Problem #3 
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Problem #4 
 
 
Problem #5 
 
 
 
Problem #6 
 
 
 
Problem #7 
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Problem #8 
 
 
Problem #9 
 
Problem #10 
 
 
Problem #11 
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Problem #12 
 
 
Problem #13 
 
 
 
Problem #14 
 
 
Problem #15 
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Problem #16 
 
 
Problem #17 
 
 
Problem #18 
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Appendix F. Vocabulary Reasoning Measure used in Study One 
 
 
Instructions 
Below you will see a list of 60 letter strings. Some of the strings are actual words and some are 
not. You are to read through the list of items and indicate whether or not you think the letter 
string is a word by putting a check mark next to those that you know to be words. Do not guess, 
but only check those who you know to be words. 
*Foils are bolded (there are 40 real words and 20 foils/nonwords) 
 
Scoring 
Sum correct number of words checked off, and subtract off number of foils checked 
 
1. absolution  _____ 31. neotatin  _____ 
2. arrate  _____ 32. niche  _____ 
3. asinine  _____ 33. nonquasity  _____ 
4. audible  _____ 34. nuance  _____ 
5. ceiloplaty  _____ 35. nitrous  _____ 
6. clandestine  _____ 36. optimize  _____ 
7. comectial  _____ 37. plabage  _____ 
8. concurrent  _____ 38. polarity  _____ 
9. confluence  _____ 39. potomite  _____ 
10. connote  _____ 40. purview  _____ 
11. denotation  _____ 41. recidivism  _____ 
12. denouement  _____ 42. reportage  _____ 
13. disconcert  _____ 43. reverent  _____ 
14. disler  _____ 44. rochead  _____ 
15. dropant  _____ 45. seblement  _____ 
16. epicurean  _____ 46. sheal  _____ 
17. eventuate  _____ 47. sparkhouse  _____ 
18. fusigenic  _____ 48. stratagem  _____ 
19. gustation  _____ 49. subjugate  _____ 
20. heuristic  _____ 50. substratum  _____ 
21. hyplexion  _____ 51. suffuse  _____ 
22. ineffity  _____ 52. tenacious  _____ 
23. inflect  _____ 53. tradured  _____ 
24. inundate  _____ 54. tumcier  _____ 
25. irksome  _____ 55. ubiquitous  _____ 
26. lacuna  _____ 56. unction  _____ 
27. languor  _____ 57. unmanal  _____ 
28. laudatory  _____ 58. wanderlust  _____ 
29. litany  _____ 59. waterfowl  _____ 
30. metenetion  _____ 60. xenophobia  _____ 
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Appendix G. Cognitive Reflection Test used in Study Two 
1. A shirt and a pair of socks cost $120 in total.  The shirt costs $100 more than the 
socks.  How much do the socks cost?  
Correct answer = 10, intuitive answer = 20 
2. A class of students was lined up in a single-file line. Jerry was the 10th student from the 
front and the 10th from the back of the line. How many students were lined up?  
Correct answer = 19, intuitive answer = 20 
3. The number of bacteria in a container doubles each hour. If it takes 32 hours to 
completely fill the container, how many hours would it take for the bacteria to fill half of 
the container?   
Correct answer = 31, intuitive answer = 16 
4. If it takes one minute to make each cut, how long will it take to cut a 25-foot wooden 
plank into 25 equal pieces?   
Correct answer = 24, intuitive answer = 25 
5. If a town has 3 girls for every 4 boys, what fraction of the children are girls? 
Correct answer = 3/7 or 3 seventh, intuitive answer = 3/4 
6. If it takes 5 carpenters 5 seconds to hammer in 5 nails, how long would it take 100 
carpenters to hammer in 100 nails (in seconds)?  
Correct answer = 5, intuitive answer = 100 
7. A snail starts at the bottom of a well that is 16 feet deep. He crawls up 4 feet each day, 
but each night he slips back 3 feet. How long will it take the snail to reach the top of the 
well? 
17 days, 16 days (intuitive answer), 15 days (intuitive answer), 14 days, 13 days (correct 
answer) 
8. The number of dandelions in a lawn doubled each year. If the lawn started out with a 
single dandelion in the first year and became completely covered by dandelions at 10 
years, when was the lawn half covered with dandelions (in years)? 
Correct answer = 9, intuitive answer = 5 
9. You can get a combo of a hamburger and french fries for $12. The hamburger costs $10 
more than the french fries. How much do the french fries cost (in dollars)?  
Correct answer = 1, intuitive answer = 2 
10. A farmer has a barn that is 100 metres wide. He would like to divide it into10 stalls that 
are each 10 metres wide. How many walls separating the stalls will he need to build? 
Correct answer = 9, intuitive answer = 10 
11. Lisa was in a cross country race. She finished the race with both the 35st fastest and 25st 
slowest time. How many students were in the race? 
Correct answer = 59, intuitive answer = 60 
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Appendix H. Actively Open-minded Thinking Scale used in Study Two 
Rating scale 
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = moderately disagree, 3 = disagree, 4 = agree, 5 = moderately agree, 6 = 
strongly agree 
 
Scoring 
Higher scores indicate higher endorsements of contaminated mindware beliefs 
(R) indicates items need to be reverse scored 
 
1. Changing your mind is a sign of weakness. (R) 
2. A person should always consider new possibilities. 
3. If I think longer about a problem I will be more likely to solve it.  
4. Basically, I know everything I need to know about the important things in life. (R) 
5. Considering too many different opinions often leads to bad decisions. (R) 
6. Solutions to problems usually happen by thinking about them, rather than by waiting for 
good luck.  
7. It's OK to be undecided about some things.  
8. It’s bad to change how you think about something. (R)  
9. Coming to decisions quickly is a sign of wisdom. (R)   
10. It doesn’t really matter if I get some facts wrong because the facts are always changing 
anyway.  (R) 
11. I like to gather many different types of information or evidence before I decide what to do.  
12. I don't feel I have to have reasons for what I do.  (R) 
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Appendix I. 5-item International Cognitive Achievement Resource used as a cognitive ability 
index in Study Two 
 
Instructions: Answer the following five questions to the best of your ability. 
 
1. What number is one fifth of one fourth of one ninth of 900? 
2, 3, 4, 5 (correct answer), 6, 7, None of these 
 
2. If the day after tomorrow is two days before Thursday then what day is it today? 
Friday, Monday, Wednesday, Saturday, Tuesday, Sunday (correct answer), None of these  
 
3. In the following alphanumeric series, what letter comes next? Q, S, N, P, L, ...  
J, H, I, N (correct answer), M, L, None of these  
 
4. Please choose which figure best fits in the picture below 
 
 
 
Correct answer = B 
5. All the dice have a unique image on each side. Select the dice that could represent a 
rotation of the dice marked X: 
 
 
Correct answer = B 
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Appendix J. Academic Achievement Measure used in Study Two 
Instruction 
What is your average in school in each of following subjects? If you are not taking this subject 
this year, please provide the last final grade you had for each subject in percent out of 100.  
 
English _______% 
Sciences ______ % 
Math ______ % 
Social Studies or History______ % 
 
